

European Cultural Policies

2015

*A Report with Scenarios on the Future of Public Funding
for Contemporary Art in Europe*

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edited by Maria Lind, Raimund Minichbauer

european cultural policies

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Education and Culture

Culture 2000



INTRODUCTION

European Cultural Policies 2015: A Report with Scenarios on the Future of Public Funding for Contemporary Art in Europe

Maria Lind

It is 2015. Art is almost completely instrumentalised—regardless of whether its financing is private or public. Art services either national or European interests, where it is especially useful in the construction or reinforcement of specific identities. At the same time, art is a desirable commercial product. It is ideal for collecting and it contributes to regional development whilst providing society with new creative employment opportunities. Visiting art museums and centres is a popular, easily digested leisure activity. In 2015 art is also used to stave off undesirable fascistic and nationalistic tendencies in society.

This is one way of viewing the near future according to the eight contributors to *European Cultural Policies 2015: A Report with Scenarios on the Future of Public Funding for Contemporary Art in Europe*. The report is a collaboration between IASPIS (International Artists Studio Programme in Sweden) EIPCP (European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies) and ÅBÅKE, an international design group based in London. The report has been produced on the occasion of the Frieze Art Fair 2005.

The other way to view future development would be towards a more critically oriented art—a cultural practice that finds its own route via the establishment of self-supporting micro-systems. This vision of art is not necessarily adapted for exhibitions and other established institutional formats while it would remain an important component of civil society. This more engaged system would encompass more forms of collaboration than present-day art appears to do. All according to the contributors to the report. But how would it be funded?

It would be useful to take a moment to look at the present. Without making any value judgements about the question of the relationship between commercial and non-commercial art activities, you could say that it is increasingly

difficult to distinguish the private and commercial from the public and non-commercial. The categories are extremely porous. Different values and capital flow in diverse directions and are exchanged. Frieze Foundation—the not for profit organisation responsible for administering, commissioning and producing a curatorial programme (Frieze Projects, Talks and Education) realised annually at Frieze Art Fair—does for instance receive public funding from amongst other organisations, Arts Council England. The Frieze Art Fair is a commercial company, initiated in 2002 by the publishers of Frieze magazine, and it is still 'brought to you' by them, as the website states. The fair is in turn organised by Frieze Events Ltd. All entities clearly being part of the 'Frieze brand', and with some of the same individuals appearing in all of them.¹ In addition to the commercial galleries, publicly financed institutions such as the Portikus, Frankfurt; the Stedelijk Museum Bureau Amsterdam; Sala Rekalde in Bilbao and the Project in Dublin participate in the Frieze Art Fair, through their collaboration with Frieze Foundation. It is established practice now for art fairs to invite public institutions to take part. But the Frieze Foundation has changed the nature of the collaboration involved by entering into a formal relationship with public institutions involved in the fair, which involves commonly applying for public funding. The Frieze Foundation has received large sums of money from the European Union's cultural fund, *Culture 2000*. In many ways the activities of the Frieze Foundation and the Frieze Art Fair seem to anticipate the Private Public Partnerships that the report claims will increase drastically in the next decade.

The Frieze Art Fair is generally considered to be a success.² Business is going well and there are many visitors. Ambitions are high and the purpose of the Project (Frieze Art Fair 2005–7: Artists Projects and Talks Programme, organised by the Frieze Foundation), which plays an important role at the Fair is, among other things, 'to increase the general acceptance and awareness of international contemporary art; inform and educate artists, critics, curators, gallery owners, students and the general public about international

contemporary art, create an annual programme of challenging debate, feature leading international practitioners, that will become part of the cultural landscape and help broaden the public's interest in contemporary art'.³ This sounds like a statement that could come from any museum or public gallery. It could be claimed that art fairs have taken over aspects of the public art institutions' role and have become arenas for exchange and innovation. Public spaces struggle with increased revenue quotas. Politicians and civil servants insist on external project financing. They make greater demands for public-friendly exhibition programmes. They also display a concomitant nervousness about more experimental and critical art. Successful art fairs on the other hand can afford to be challenging. Their funding is rarely in danger and everything that can be linked to investigation, challenge and exchange is an added bonus.⁴ So connecting a non-profit foundation to a commercial fair is a win-win situation in today's cultural economy.

Does this mean that the agenda of the art-world has shifted from art museums and galleries to art fairs? If so, what are the consequences for artists and the art they produce today? It can be illuminating to look at the specific types of collaboration between the Frieze Foundation and publicly financed institutions. In addition to placing their expertise and credibility at the disposal of the art fair, art institutions each participate by collaborating and financing a new art project. Preferably these projects involve timely work. The budget should be at least 15,000 €. ⁵ As a result, in 2005 this cooperation with the Frieze Foundation has made it possible to apply for and receive 179,000 € from *Culture 2000*.⁶ In return, the art institutions receive 'the expertise and credibility of Frieze Foundation and Frieze Art Fair's resources, space at the fair appropriate to the material manifestation of the project, any relevant production, construction or distribution support, project documentation and evaluation, a number of paid-for nights at a hotel in London, invitations to participate in a plethora of hosting and networking events, comprehensive national and international print and digital

marketing plus the relevant media support and — not least — access to a very large number of visitors'.⁷ In 2003, 27,602 people came to the art fair and in 2004 the number had risen to 30,822 visitors, which is about the same attendance as an average exhibition at the Whitechapel Gallery. Media coverage of the fair, however, is impressive and you have the chance to attract a different sort of attention than you might usually. Interestingly enough, the collaborating institutions and the artists they work with, receive no other project funding beyond that of the 'Project' agreement from the 179,000 € that the Frieze Foundation has received from Culture 2000, i e no additional funding.

As 'lead partner' in this arrangement, the Frieze Foundation has the right to decline project proposals that the 'partners' submit. This happened to Iaspis' proposal this year, which was rejected on the grounds that one of the two suggested artists had already been invited to carry out one of the Frieze Foundation's own projects. This resulted in internal discussions at Iaspis, a state-financed institution, about the relation between publicly financed art institutions and the commercial contexts today. Specifically how these relationships influence artists and what kind of latitude artists have in different economic contexts. And importantly, what constitutes a 'collaboration' today. A new proposal was submitted and after a slight hesitation, this report, *European Cultural Policies 2015: A Report with Scenarios on the Future of Public Funding for Contemporary Art in Europe*, was accepted by the Frieze Foundation. In the report eight authors from various parts of Europe have studied and analysed today's situation, in seven regions. In addition, forward-looking European Union policymaking has been taken into account and on this basis the authors have drawn up scenarios for what the situation might look like in 2015. As the future of public funding for contemporary art is closely connected to the future of cultural policy in general, many of the authors also discuss that here.

The picture that emerges in the eight texts shows many local variations. What the authors found was sometimes

obvious and already discernible but on occasions they have come up with surprising results. An undeniable thread of all the texts is that art is becoming more and more instrumental. This is especially true in terms of national/European identity and when it is seen as primarily an economic stimulant. Rebecca Gordon Nesbitt, who has studied the situation in Great Britain, with Scotland as a case study, traces a clear trend of instrumentalisation of art on the part of the state. This is partly in relation to notion of social inclusion and stimulation of the labour market. This situation has arisen as a result of the growth of Public Private Partnerships, which are common in other areas of society and dominate within transport and health care. The Arts Council of England supports the idea that the private art market is superior to the endeavours that have traditionally been associated with public activities. This tends to stimulate a certain type of art production while suppressing the kind of art that challenges the status quo and is critical. According to Rebecca Gordon Nesbitt, in ten years this will lead to a serious polarisation of art. On one hand the public and the private will have combined into a unified market; on the other, many artists will have started up new organisations alongside political activists in order to develop new self-sustaining cultural micro-economies.

Branca Ćurčić's study of Serbia and Montenegro reveals a situation that is best described as fragmented. State institutions are wholly dependent upon state subsidies, which flow automatically to them. Independent organisations, however, are constantly forced to reapply for minimal grants. Nevertheless, a number of small organisations with independent financing—for example, Rex and kuda.org—have taken on the responsibilities that usually come under the jurisdiction of state institutions. Direct support for artists is limited, as is the influence of the market. Interestingly enough, some direct support comes from the Swiss Pro Helvetia—a possible harbinger of the future. Branca Ćurčić's prognosis is that the primary financing of art in 2015 will come from international public sources, albeit ones based on strictly regulated cultural policies. Parallel to this, individual, working

artists will face competition from new networks and informal groupings of artists who will join together to obtain greater influence. Ćurčić underlines the necessity of a clear distinction between commercial and non-commercial production of culture. This will require education about how different spheres function if we are to avoid a situation where the art market becomes 'the most important regulator of aesthetics and trends in the art field'.

When Berlin once more became the capital of a unified Germany a significant shift in German cultural life took place—from the regions to the capital. This 'nationalisation' has, according to Cornelia Sollfrank, coincided with the renewal of a view of Germany as a 'cultural nation', whose culture can be understood as *Leitkultur*, i.e. as a 'leading culture'. This has led to several prestigious and politically motivated projects. For example, the private Flick Collection at Nationalgalerie, Hamburger Bahnhof has been financed with public money. The collection's value has therefore increased as a result of public funding from a virtually bankrupt city. Cornelia Sollfrank sees this as a typical example of how public/private partnerships have for the most part favoured the private sphere and its criteria of success. A notion of success based on high attendance and large supplementary sources of revenue. Against this background it is hardly surprising that less than 1% of public subsidies go directly to artists—and that this proportion is diminishing. The classic humanist-bourgeois tradition of supporting 'non-mainstream' work and art with a narrow public has now been replaced by economic and functionalist attitudes and actions. Sollfrank's hope rests on self-organised micro-systems. They can offer resistance to a view of the next decade where everything creative must be saleable and where the number of art museums has halved. The alternative is that by 2015 art institutions will have become equal parts leisure centre and theme park.

Hüseyin Bhari Alptekin is more optimistic about developments in Turkey. Since there is no serious cultural policy in Turkey today—certainly none that favours art—there's not much to lose. Private sponsors and companies

are becoming more and more active and are learning to appreciate links to EU policies. Turkey has become prominent with several art projects in Istanbul and Ankara and also in Diyarbakir and Izmir. Bhari Alptekin notes that more and more non-Turkish artists and other cultural producers come to Istanbul to live and work—but cautions against exoticism and its consequent conditioning that can so easily accompany policy-related exchanges. But such exchanges do create fruitful collaborations and enable Turkish artists to have greater possibilities to do projects abroad. By 2015 Hüseyin Bhari Alptekin would like to see a diminished hierarchy between artists and public funding. An alternative would favour more critical perspectives based on similarities rather than differences, where art is another form of knowledge generator.

Historically, art in Belgium has been characterised by cultural policies based on a separation between Flemish and French. There have also been a comparatively large number of private collectors within a rich system of alternative activities. Frédéric Jacquemin points out that this has created the myth that artists benefit from the commercial system, while in fact beside a handful of artists it is only the middlemen who profit. The newly-established state-funded ‘artist statute’ (funding of 1,000 €/month) which is supposed to guarantee a regular income for artists has not functioned properly. The criteria for receiving this social benefit is more closely associated with the ‘creative industries’—advertising and communication—than with serious artistic work. According to Frédéric Jacquemin, 2015 will see many small steps completed in the global transformation of the cultural apparatus. The many art centres in the previously dilapidated regions of Belgium will be financed mainly by supra-state organisations like the EU as part of a massive investment in cultural infrastructures. The primary direction will be towards satisfying the new corporate hunger for art and to keep the ‘body politic’ free from undesired fascist and nationalistic movements.

Oleg Kireev describes Russia as a society in genuine transition, where artists strive for international acceptance

and integration. This means increasing commercialisation. This has already begun with a large number of new galleries and an art fair in Moscow where the local middle class comprise important visitors and potential purchasers. There is no public support for artists, apart from the so-called *Black Square Prize* of 5,000 €, which was first awarded in 2004. According to Oleg Kireev this development has already had three palpable consequences: the vulgarisation and de-conceptualisation of art, which can easily fall to cartoon levels; the disappearance of critics and the critical discourse, that are surplus to the requirements of selling art. Finally there is the growth of a new avant-garde that emerges from the margins of the prevailing system. He views the avant-garde as part of society’s nervous and immune systems and he sees it growing around the National Contemporary Art Centres, that are financed by the Ministry of Culture, such as those in Yekaterinburg, Nizhni Novgorod and Kaliningrad. In these situations individual artists and groups who were born since the mid-70s have begun to test new ideas. People located in the peripheries make contact with each other, bypassing the centre of power in Moscow. In the future, Kireev predicts that art in Russia will have a greater role in establishing civil society and that it will function as an important contact between intellectuals and the general public.

Tone Hansen writes that by 2015 the situation in Norway, which is still not part of the EU, will see more money than ever invested in art through a Forum for Culture and Business and foreign aid. The State is also keen on using its institutions and it wants to see palpable social effects from its cultural support. However, a number of public institutions have been privatised which has resulted in diminished transparency and accountability. This has reduced debate in the public sphere. Outsourcing of projects has widened the gap between artists and institutions. Artists can no longer rely on exhibition fees, which has been introduced in the 1970s. Institutions now see themselves as facilitators rather than responsible actors within the social sphere. As several of the other authors have pointed out, Tone Hansen underlines that artists who refuse

to become part of the entertainment industry will inevitably live under deteriorating conditions.

How do all these regional reports relate to what is going on on the supranational, European level? Plans for a new cultural programme, to follow *Culture 2000*, have existed as a proposal from the European Commission since 2004. However, due to the rejection of the European constitution in France and the Netherlands, and the failed budget negotiations for 2007–2013, the process has been delayed. Nevertheless, according to Raimund Minichbauer some changes are expected: structural improvements such as a more open style of governance, including the obligation to be more user-friendly. There have also been more conservative proposals that would involve increased funding for translations of Greek and Latin classical works and economic proposals limited to stimulating so-called ‘creative industries’. Political ambitions are reduced in *Culture 2007* in comparison to earlier programmes. The basic attitude is more defensive, abandoning the old idea of culture’s intrinsic value in favour of its functionality as part of EU citizenship, image-making and foreign policy. More clearly than its predecessor, *Culture 2007* only relates to Europe.

As part of the restructuring of the whole EU budget, funding for agriculture will be transferred to knowledge-based-economies, which should benefit the cultural industries. Whether this will positively affect the non-commercial art field remains an open question. Another change is that the structure of desired cooperations, now called ‘co-operation focal points’, will require more partners, longer co-operations and higher budget thresholds, thereby privileging big players from richer member states. Parallel to this, support for European networks has resulted in an infrastructure for transnational cooperation on a more self-organised level which has made such structures visible as a funding possibility. One of the main questions therefore is how much the EU is ready to invest in long-term basic funding for transnational infrastructures.

At the Frieze Art Fair in October 2005, the report will be distributed free of charge. In November 2005 a workshop will be held at Iaspis in Stockholm in which tactics and strategies for concrete action based on the report will be discussed. The workshop in Stockholm will later be followed up by workshops in Vienna and elsewhere. The report will also be available as a pdf-file on www.iaspis.com and www.eipcp.net.

1. www.friezeartfair.com

Frieze Foundation shares the same office and many of the same administrative staff as Frieze Art Fair and *Frieze* magazine. Each organisation is run separately as its own distinct company. Amanda Sharp and Matthew Slotover are the directors of Frieze Art Fair and publishers of *Frieze* magazine, as well as the directors of the Frieze Foundation, where they act as advisors to the programme.

2. In 2003 the turnover of the galleries at the Frieze Art Fair was officially £ 11.1 million but is estimated to be more like £ 16–20 million. In 2004, the official sum was £ 19.6 million but estimated to be more like £ 26 million. The profit is not made public.

3. Quote from the Co-Operation Agreement (C&C CORP/SJE: LN:1A31AE5_45(5)).

4. ‘Frieze Foundation’s funding is not and has never been “ensured or assured”. Since its inception in 2002 funding for the programme has been raised independently by the directors, the curator and the curatorial assistant. In years 2003 and 2004 funding was secured annually. In 2004 core funding was secured for years 2005–2007 from European Union and Arts Council England. “investigation, challenge and exchange” is not “an added bonus” it is central to what we do.’

Quote from Polly Staple, Frieze Foundation Curator from email correspondence with Maria Lind, Director of Iaspis, 20 September 2005.

5. Synopsis of ‘CULTURE 2000: SPECIFICATIONS FOR 2005: ANNEX C: FORMAL ELIGIBILITY AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA B. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA’: ‘The specifications for the *Culture 2000* application stipulates that each co-

organiser of an annual or multi-annual project must contribute a minimum of 5% of the total budget. In August 2004 Iaspis was invited to participate in an annual co-operation agreement project. As the total budget for the 1-year project was 300,000 €, Iaspis was invited to participate on the condition that the organisation would contribute 15,000 €. In return for the 15,000 € contribution, Frieze Foundation agreed to allocate 15,000 € of the grant to project production costs as well as several other non-monetary benefits.

‘In October 2004 it was decided that it would be preferable to submit a multi-annual co-operation agreement, to secure funding for a longer period. As the budget for the 3-year project was approximately 900,000 €, the 5% contribution from each organisation had to increase to 45,000 €.’

Quote from Kitty Anderson, Frieze Foundation Curatorial Assistant in reference to the co-operation agreement between Frieze Foundation and partners by email 21 September 2005.

6. In 2003 the Frieze Foundation received 135,616.97 € from *Culture 2000*, and the following year, 148,520 €. The Foundation’s application for 2005–2007, granted in May 2005 is comprising 537,900 € over three years.

7. Quote from Polly Staple, from email correspondence with Maria Lind, 20 September 2005.

Cultural policies in Europe are not only a marginal political field in the EU's range of competences, but also a vague terrain in terms of relevant research and theorisation. Even though numerous empirical studies on individual partial areas of the theme exist, they remain not only restricted to certain regions or narrowly delimited topics, in most cases they are also instrumental, trivial or under-theorised. This makes it all the more difficult to seriously comply with the ambitions of the present study, specifically to formulate statements pertaining to the mid-term perspectives of this complex field and to our specific focus on contemporary art. To avoid succumbing to poetic speculation or fiction—even though that would hold a certain charm—the coordinator of the study, Raimund Minichbauer, and our institute eipcp have secured the approach to this endeavor with the following preconditions.

1. Instead of preparing a comprehensive study taking a totalizing view of Europe as a whole (regardless of where the borders of this Europe are fantasised to be), we have asked seven experts from different regions to develop the regional specificities and disparities of their cultural-political experiences. This is intended to highlight both the respective distinctive features and the similarities of various national and regional tendencies in cultural policies.

2. We have supplemented these reports with a critical view of the specific developments of EU cultural policies, including the future of public funding for contemporary art in Europe. Plans for the future EU cultural programme that is intended to operationalise European cultural policies from 2007–2013 as the successor to Culture 2000 provided a useful standard of comparison.

3. In order to be able to make a reasonably realistic assessment of future cultural policies, the individual essays draw specific lines from the developments of the past ten to fifteen years. Extending these lines into the future, projecting images of possible cultural-political arrangements in relation to contemporary art into the year 2015 on the basis of heterogeneous experience and reflection, is the method of this study.

4. Our hope is that the foundation of assessments of cultural-political developments thus formulated will enable drawing conclusions about progressive cultural policies in Europe and especially about their resistive positioning in a field of cultural producers, who regard the critique of cultural policies in Europe as a necessary component of their own work.

Sometimes it seems as though the political and social conditions that we live in and within Europe are simply regressing back to the rigid forms that marked the 1950s in respectively different ways on both sides of the Cold War: authoritarianism, top-down consensus and the rigid exclusion of minorities in general, the persecution of political artists, the abolishment of undesirable institutions, censorship and criminalisation in the realm of cultural policies. In this respect, the year 1968 and the 1970s could be seen as a brief rupture, which was and will continue to be followed by the reconstruction of the constrained, ordered conditions of the subsequent decades well into the new millennium.

A closer look, however, shows the developments of the past fifty years to be less of a briefly interrupted repetition of the same reactionary pattern, but rather a complex and successive advancement of neoliberal capitalism and the increasingly rapid appropriation of the respective forms of resistance. In the years following World War II, the European nation-states in Western Europe were still constructed in a way that the state apparatus regulated the capitalist machine. Without affording more room to the molecular hot spots, the micro-fascisms of the various forms of fascism from the first half of the century, these molar state apparatuses were models of hard segmentarity, of totalisation and centralisation. The task of cultural policies was accordingly to striate the nations as cultural nations and strengthen national identities. State attacks on avant-garde (or even just modern) art—which were in Austria, for instance, even partly in continuity with the NS regime—were able to contribute to strengthening this cultural-political authoritarianism.

With the molecular revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s

this paradigm of hard segmentarity in the nation-states of Western Europe was finally ruptured. A phase of testing emancipatory concepts emerged at the cultural-political level, which the Western European left-wing derived primarily from the cultural policies of the early Soviet Union (Proletkult, LEF, Productivism, Constructivism). 'Culture for all' and 'culture from all' were to bring art to the street and into life for a second time, but failed this time not because of the structuralization of the state apparatus and cultural policies as in Stalin's Soviet Union, but because of post-fordist capitalism's potential for adaptation.

Here appropriation turns around completely: the state apparatuses are now merely parts of the capitalist machine, which can be opposed or added to. Whereas the movement of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in the post-war years could still be regarded as the over-coding of the capitalist machine by the state apparatus, in the context of the development labeled globalisation, we must speak of an inverse appropriation and coding of the state apparatus by the machine. The 1968 generation is part of this deterritorialisation; in its anti-military, feminist and non-representationist streams this generation opposed the authoritarian nation-state, but also increasingly paved the way for the shattering of the welfare state in the years thereafter. This also applies to the withdrawal of state cultural policies and financing. While supposed to contribute to ever new waves of molecular battles, during the 1980s and 1990s the emancipatory cultural policy concepts of the 1970s lost their explosive force and turned into a new paradigm of the spectacle, of creativity, and of productivity.

In both the current practice and the programming of cultural policies in Europe today, there are traces to be found from all three phases outlined above:

1. The old pathos of the concept of culture appears as a replica of the authoritarian 1950s in phrases that continue to invoke culture as an instrument for forming identity, yet even in its most up-to-date form of 'European identity' it is hardly able to deny its origins in the culturalism, cultural humanism

and cultural essentialism of past centuries. Coupled with the old colonial idea that culture is eminently suited as a vanguard of expansion or as a marketing instrument for the nation (or super-nation), cultural identity (especially as European cultural identity) is popular for all kinds of links between identity politics and *kulturkampf* politics. At the level of European policy papers as well, harmonious sounding phrases often mask culturalist (community through cultural identity), economic (location factor) and exclusionist phantasms (excluding the Other of Europe, whether it is Islamic, American or extraterrestrial).

2. With the adaptation, or rather the perversion of emancipatory practices of the 1970s, the field of cultural policies increasingly becomes a space of action for neoliberal governmentality: participation becomes obligatory, creativity becomes an imperative, transparency becomes total surveillance, life-long learning turns into a threat, education means permanent social control, and grassroots democracy means developing software that applicants for cultural funding can use to evaluate one another. Diverse outsourcing models and mediator positions form a network of dependencies, operating in a way that is far more complex and thorough than the old lord—vassal hierarchy of cultural support in the past. Autonomous cultural initiatives meet with a fate similar to that of the autonomous genius-artist; specifically in the precarious aspect of their autonomy, they become necessary agents of governmentality control.

3. However, in addition to the control society instruments of internalising control in an increasingly complex network of institutions and NGOs (and in the self of the actors), the old disciplining authority of the state arises again, but this time as an effect of neoliberal economisation and unbounded deregulation, appearing in the realm of culture in the form of requirements for 'third-party funding', public-private partnership, audience numbers, economic evaluations, cultural support for the creative industries, or simply substituting private resources for state responsibility. In the advancement of post-fordist capitalism, it seems that

a transition has taken place here from a purportedly liberal phase to an authoritarian one, in which economisation and the dispositive of security supplement one another. Everywhere that these tendencies are picked up and in conjunction with a broader movement to repress critical elements, exceptional cases of criminalisation and direct repression become more widespread. Current examples of this renewed turn to the authoritarian in cultural policies as well include such very different cases as that of the PublixTheatreCaravan in Italy, the Critical Art Ensemble and Steve Kurtz in the USA, or the exhibition *Caution, Religion* at the Sakharov Center in Moscow.

For the future it may be expected that there will be an even closer interweaving of these three lines of identity culturalism, governmentality control, and renewed authoritarian interventions on the part of a nation-state otherwise staging its retreat. Along with this, there is the danger of a further loss of autonomy in the content of art production, cultural work and cultural policies, of the political in art increasingly being taken over and of a greater scarcity of funding for democracy-political and critical aspects in cultural policies. For the prognosis of developments for cultural policies and cultural funding in Europe over the next ten years, this juncture is the most important point of reference, suggesting that negative effects are to be anticipated at every level (from the local through the national to the supranational).

This is why strategies are needed to strengthen and link radical reformist elements of the cultural-political discourse in Europe—in other words the elements that not only aim for smaller regulating measures within the limited field of cultural policies. The term ‘radical reformist’ is intended to demonstrate that—particularly in the governmentality setting—it is not sufficient, in our opinion, to attack the various state apparatuses in an abstract negation, to regard social movements as the absolute Other of institutions (whether they are state bureaucracies, independent NGOs or autonomous self-organisations). On the other hand, it is indeed a matter of producing ruptures that cut through monopolising

entanglement in the network of multiplied mediation. The point is to find methods other than the interventions of special interest groups and lobbies, and to promote contents that at least temporarily resist re-coding: for instance in the exemplary idea of the French Intermittents, who not only defend their rights, but also demand the extension of these rights from the field of cultural work in the direction of a general basic income; or in pushing for a general strategy against the Fortress Europe to fight against repressive measures in the area of security, migration, asylum and legal policies.

In addition to the exchange of knowledge about cultural political developments in the various regions of Europe, this study is also a means of the concatenation of actors in this segment. Among other things, it is intended to strengthen awareness, (self-) criticism and reflection of the political role of (art) institutions as agents (with their power of positive and negative impact). Finally, the strategies that are to be developed are intended to promote the transversalisation of the radical reformist, cultural political discourse. The code 2015 thus takes on the character of a possible objective of political formation.

I would like to thank Isabell Lorey and my eipcp colleagues Andrea Hummer, Raimund Minichbauer and Stefan Nowotny for criticism and advice.

Despite a modicum of autonomy having been devolved to Scotland, Wales and (in times of peace) Northern Ireland, policy in the United Kingdom¹ is still largely dictated by the central government at Westminster² which, in turn, reflects the increasingly neo-liberal priorities of the Blair administration. In May, 2004, Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, published a discussion document which exemplified the New Labour vision of culture.³ Defending art from leftist charges of elitism, in language that sought to endear the culture sector, she argued for the recognition of the inherent worth of culture:

Too often politicians have been forced to debate culture in terms only of its instrumental benefits to other agendas — education, the reduction of crime, improvements in well-being—explaining—or, in some cases, apologising for—our investment in culture in terms of something else. In political and public discourse in this country we have avoided the more difficult approach of investigating, questioning and celebrating what culture actually does in and of itself.

In somewhat contradictory fashion, Jowell went on to argue that 'as a Culture Department we still have to deliver the utilitarian agenda and the measures of instrumentality that this implies...'. Having thus paved the way for the sensitive instrumentalisation of art, she lauded its transformative potential. Exempting government from tackling the root causes of inequality, she appropriated culture as a tool in combating 'poverty of aspiration', which she identified as the main obstacle separating rich from poor, presumably on the basis that aspiration is all that is necessary to remove individuals from poverty. One of the few critical responses to this document decried the lack of acknowledgement of the critical potential of art:

...Jowell edges uncomfortably close to a new social mission for the arts... What this leaves out—if not denies—is art's provocative role. Through much of the past 50 years, art has been properly concerned not to cement national identity but to question it. In that, it continued the great modernist

project of 'making strange', of disrupting rather than confirming how we see the world and our place in it...⁴

Indeed, as we shall see, little understanding of criticality has been factored into state funding models. By examining as case studies the cultural policy of England and Scotland in the early years of the twenty-first century, it is possible to identify trends and, to some extent, predict the trajectories that culture will be forced to follow in the next decade.

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Evidently believing culture to be a burgeoning area and one over which a relatively toothless Scottish Executive might exert some influence, First Minister of Scotland Jack McConnell asserted in 2003:

I believe we can now make the development of our creative drive, our imagination, the next major enterprise for our society. Arts for all can be a reality, a democratic right, and an achievement of the early 21st century.⁵

Three years earlier, Scotland's National Cultural Strategy had laid the foundations for policy North of the Border.⁶ Aside from the obvious use value of culture in consolidating national identity, one of the four main strategic objectives set out in this document was to 'realise culture's potential contribution to education, promoting inclusion and enhancing people's quality of life', presaging future instrumentalisation. When the time came for the 'arms length' funding bodies to implement policy, the Scottish Arts Council responded by including in its Corporate Plan (2004–2009) a consideration of the benefits of art within Education, Social Inclusion, Tourism and the Creative Industries. Of these, perhaps the biggest white elephant is social inclusion, a catch-all term for using the arts to improve health and wellbeing, while targeting minority ethnic communities and disabled people for participation in arts activities, on the understanding that:

Tackling the complex relationship between education, health and poverty is fundamental to a concerted and long-term effort to revitalise Scotland's economy and to improve the quality of life of all its communities. We know the arts play a crucial role in making Scotland a better place to live and work

and in narrowing inequalities in society.⁷

For the Scottish Arts Council, increasing participation in the arts now takes precedence over supporting artists, with £43 million (57.8% of total budgets) being allocated for this purpose in 2005/06 in the hope that 'by 2006 [it will] increase the number of cultural programmes in areas of economic and social disadvantage and the numbers of partners engaged in supporting these programmes by 10% from a baseline set in 2003/04'.⁸ The adoption of this rhetoric caused sufficient concern within arts communities to prompt the formation of a group of unnamed artists and arts professionals, known as the Cultural Policy Collective, who published a pamphlet examining the premises of social inclusion and concluding that it is:

...premised on the top-down 'democratisation' of culture, a process aimed at engaging members of 'excluded' groups in historically privileged cultural arenas. Such a policy neither reforms the existing institutional framework of culture, nor reverses a process of damaging privatisation. Instead, it attempts to make the arts more accessible in order to adapt its target audiences to an increasingly deregulated labour market.⁹

Not only does the use of culture within a social inclusion agenda encourage previously disenfranchised workers to play a productive role in the economy, but it also aims to project a veneer of job satisfaction from within the sector, with 'empowered' arts workers finding self esteem through their poorly paid work. By ring-fencing cultural spending in this way, to plug the gaps in health and education, social inclusion policy acts as a palliative that simultaneously does nothing to address the causes of inequality in society and again fails to recognise the critical potential of art.

While an examination of the 1991 census identifies an estimated 2% of the workforce of Scotland engaged in cultural occupations and an extrapolation of figures collected in a 2003 audit shows that visual artists contribute £22 million to the Scottish economy, the same report demonstrates that 82% of visual artists in Scotland earn less than £5,000

per year from their practice, with 28% earning nothing whatsoever.¹⁰ The Scottish Artists' Union¹¹, established in 2001 along traditional trade union lines, aims to address such inequalities of income, following similar attempts by the Artists' Union¹² in London (1972–1983) and initiatives beyond the UK. Current realities would suggest, however, that artists are barely more empowered than when they first began unionising.

Rather than investing in the research and development of artistic practice or in the grassroots organisations that do the most to support this practice, the visual art department of the Scottish Arts Council cites the maintenance of core institutions as its main priority within its remit to increase participation and pours the majority of its funding (more than 93% of voted funds) into an infrastructure of galleries and museums under the misapprehension that some of it will trickle down to artists through nominal fees.¹³ Only a tiny percentage of visual arts funding reaches artists directly, tending to favour those with a proven track record rather than those at the start of their 'careers'.¹⁴ There is little transparency about how grants are awarded and minimal involvement of artists in decision-making processes or strategic planning committees.

In April 2004, a Cultural Commission was set up by the Scottish Executive to review cultural provision in Scotland, which is likely to see the demise of the Arts Council in favour of centralised (Scottish Executive) or localised (local authority) control of cultural provision.¹⁵ Representations have been made on behalf of artists and grassroots communities for better direct support and resources, but it remains to be seen, when the Commission reports back to the Executive at the end of June 2005, the extent to which these wishes are taken into account. Elsewhere, questions are being raised as to the viability of continuing to accept compromised public funding. Francis McKee—who curated the first dedicated representation of Scotland at the Venice Biennale in 2003 and the recent Glasgow International and is, therefore, well placed to understand the national and local funding situation—has commented:

*At root, there is a lack of confidence in public funding for the arts. The government do not demonstrate any passionate commitment to the funding for artists—either forgetting the reasons for the introduction of such public funding or no longer believing in the original principles of that contract. Perhaps it is time to reassess the whole basis of the relationships between the art community and the government. It may be wrong for the government to have any involvement with the arts in contemporary society and the old expectations of funding may be redundant. In this case, artists might have to accept that it would be healthier to expect no public funding rather than continued funding from bodies unconvinced or unable to understand the role of the arts in their culture...*¹⁶

Whether artists are rendered ineligible for public funding by failing to meet ever more stringent criteria or whether they relinquish their claim to it altogether, it is clear that a viable economic alternative will have to be found that sustains artistic practice in the future. Public funding bodies, it seems, have their own, rather surprising, ideas on what this might be.

Where once it might have been possible to speak of a division between public and private interests, within the art microcosm, as elsewhere, there has been a steady erosion of any semblance of distinction, with a mesh of interweaving solidarities ensuring that there is an ongoing symbiosis between the two realms. It is important to note that this does not entail a nation state entirely subordinate to corporate interests; rather that ‘the illusion of a weakened state is the smokescreen thrown up by the designers of the “new order”’. Margaret Thatcher concentrated executive power while claiming the opposite; Tony Blair has done the same’.¹⁷ But it is a truism that nowadays no consideration of cultural policy in the UK public sector would be complete without mentioning the private sector.

Throughout the 1990s, multinational corporations intervened into publicly-funded arts institutions, primarily through sponsorship programmes and networking clubs.¹⁸ This move was, by and large, embraced by institutions whose ambitions had exceeded their budgets. Initially centred on

London, there is evidence that the practice of corporate sponsorship has spread throughout the UK.¹⁹ Additionally, in struggling to meet the increasing obligations of their public funding, multi-functional arts centres have largely adopted a model described elsewhere in the public sector (transport, education, health) as Public Private Partnerships, through restaurant franchising and corporate hires.

Rather than countering the trend for direct corporate intervention into the arts and publicly-funded attempts to fuel the private labour market through policies like social inclusion, or by lobbying for recognition of the critical value of art in order to safeguard it, Arts Council England responded by commissioning a report from private consultants called *Taste Buds: How to Cultivate the Art Market*.²⁰ This document unequivocally places the flourishing private market at the centre of the art system and examines how it could be better exploited, identifying a further 6.1 million potential collectors of contemporary art. In a final assimilation of public into private, the report identifies ‘subscription [...] the process by which art is filtered and legitimised’ whereby:

*Networks of art world professionals, including academics, curators, dealers, critics, artists and buyers, provide advocacy and endorsement for an artist's work through exhibitions, critical appraisal and private and public purchases. The value of an artist's work increases in direct proportion to the subscription it attracts and sustains.*²¹

Taste Buds demonstrates exactly how this process works, with all activities in what was traditionally regarded as the public sphere—from art school and artist-led activity to public gallery—rendered subordinate to the market. Significantly, the report places ‘special emphasis on the sales of “cutting edge” contemporary work, which is critically engaged’. Combined with the fact that the Department of Culture, Media and Sport has just frozen Arts Council England funding (which essentially means a £30 million shortfall over the next few years²²), that the Welsh Arts Council narrowly escaped being scrapped in favour of centralised Welsh Assembly control²³ and that the Cultural Commission in

Scotland is likely to recommend more centralised control, it could be assumed that, by potentially finding a private home for even the most challenging artwork, Arts Council England is pre-emptively exempting itself from support.

In Scotland, this move towards the private market has been paralleled by funding being ear-marked for art fairs²⁴ and a 'collecting initiative'²⁵ (which has so far seen the production of a leaflet²⁶ to engender a new art-buying public and the introduction of interest-free loans for the purpose²⁷). Ongoing public funding for Glasgow's internationally successful commercial gallery, The Modern Institute—which has arguably influenced a general move towards more readily commodifiable artwork discernible in the city—has been secured for the next three years.²⁸ The 2004 Glasgow Art Fair included stands by many grassroots organisations; lack of funding for travel means that attendance at art fairs is advocated by public funders for those voluntary initiatives wishing to broaden their networks and has been cited as the reason for artist-run Transmission taking part in the Frieze Art Fair 2004, something that would have been unthinkable a few years ago.²⁹ It comes as little surprise, therefore, that the content of artist-run spaces increasingly parallels that of commercial galleries.

What the concept of a thriving private market bridging the public funding shortfall fails to take proper account of is the position of critically-engaged art in relation to the private market. Aside from the fact that it is unrealistic to expect the most contentious work to find buyers, it is also conceivable that artists may not want to offer up their practice for commodification. In 1991, Glasgow-based artist Ross Sinclair noted that artist-led initiatives defined their own terms for how work should be made and shown and, particularly when occurring outside London, were most successful when dealing with a specifically local context rather than aspiring to adopt the language of the commodified centre:

When the context of art dissolves into the realm of formalism and the art world exclusively, it has relinquished much of its potential for social function. It loses an important

*dimension and diminishes from a potentially rounded, holistic art practice and becomes a two-dimensional veneer. Then its meaning and location exists primarily for the market and the cultural activity. Art ceases to have a wider social function other than in matters of economics.*³⁰

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Fast-forward ten years and the logical consequence of current cultural policy is that the majority of artists will no longer be able to rely on public funding for the research and production of their work.

In kowtowing to regressive, market-driven policies like social inclusion, the 'arms-length' funding bodies rendered themselves indistinguishable from Government and will have ceased to exist, replaced by bureaucrats, with no specialist arts knowledge, intent on instrumentalising culture to neo-imperial ends. When consideration is given to the negligible amount of unencumbered public funding remaining, those artists intending to voice dissent through their work—by destabilising fragile notions of national identity or challenging the wisdom of Government policies—will be the first to be discounted. While the state will continue to hand out occasional accolades in the form of residencies and awards, for those with career paths validated by its core infrastructure, artists will largely be abandoned to finding alternative sources of income, such as teaching and installation work, that is increasingly the norm.

In order to avoid this, battle needs to be waged on several fronts. Those who believe in the public provision of independent culture as a fundamental democratic right must continue to lobby for improvements in the system, to ensure that more money is disseminated directly to artists and free of obligation. As a defence against the instrumentalisation of artistic practice, a sound case needs to be made for the primacy of artistic autonomy, which has been all too easy to dismiss in the rush to harness art to a questionable political agenda. This will necessitate grassroots research into historical and contemporary practice and its appropriation by various regimes. The findings of this research will provide

sympathetic Secretaries of State with the tools they need to justify 'what culture actually does in and of itself'.

By 2015, the network of 'public' arts institutions will have consolidated itself, in partnership with the private sector, with a few casualties falling by the wayside. Without being held to account, the majority of institutions will continue failing to make any significant difference to the economies of the artists they are alleged to serve. To prevent this, the existing institutions of art need to be made more accountable and transparent. In this regard, one of the recommendations made to the Cultural Commission in Scotland on behalf of artists and grassroots organisations was that institutions should include a clear line in their budgets detailing fees to artists, aside from production or exhibition costs. This would allow for the ready comparison of institutions to each other and to national standards that are yet to be set. Institutional figures with a conscience must take a stand on matters of principle such as this and have a responsibility to set and adhere to the parameters of what is acceptable in their treatment of artists.

New organisations will be required that are capable of responding to the changing situation. In London, a diverse group has formed around Flaxman Lodge, a space established in response to the fact that 'very few economic models, forms of organisation or address[...] have managed to keep pace with the fields they claim to engage and critique'. Aiming 'to imagine building environments that might offset the crushing corporatisation of cultural space in London' Flaxman Lodge has acknowledged the 'tension between what could be referred to as its inevitable subject-centredness (courtesy of the lease, funds and space that make it possible), and its objective to build models of collective production, enunciation, sustainability'.³¹ Following an initial invitation, in March, 2004, for thirty people to join an internet forum and play a part in the democratic regulation of activities, many more people have registered to be involved, which has generated as much of a mental space as a physical one and is at the forefront of many of the issues outlined here.³² As power is concentrated in ever fewer hands, self-

sustaining economies will need to be developed that do not rely solely on the logic of capitalism. It is too early to imagine what these may be but work needs to be done in close conjunction with economists to develop new possibilities.

Abetted by the public sector, the private market will have flourished and replaced public funding as the predominant means of support for those graduating from art schools in the UK. This will tangibly affect the kind of work being made by artists. Given the convergence of public and private interests in the total orientation towards a market economy, artists wishing to undertake work that is not determined by market forces will be left with little choice besides total withdrawal and a refusal to engage with existing mechanisms. This will extend to both their individual and collective practice and the multifarious attempts by artists to bypass institutions, through their self-organised activity, in recent decades will form the basis for this.

The Cube microplex in Bristol is an interesting example of non-hierarchical voluntary labour, with more than a hundred people involved in producing a lively programme of events in an old cinema space (sometimes only tangentially related to film), relying on ticket sales for running costs and programming.³³ Jeremy Rifkin, president of the Foundation on Economic Trends in Washington DC, calculated that government provision of a 'shadow wage' through tax deductions for the partially employed and a guaranteed income for the unemployed (a move which apparently received unambiguous support in the United States as early as 1967), would work out cheaper for the government than administering community programmes themselves.³⁴ Similar moves within the voluntary sector of the art world would safeguard its necessary survival. While the introduction of salaried positions into voluntary organisations would inevitably force a significant shift in ethos that some may not be prepared to accept, the right to make a living wage should be extended to individual artists and those working in grassroots organisations.

Another avenue of expression for critically-engaged practice may be found by linking with broader critical and activist agendas. In this regard, *Variant* magazine is a pioneer; the current issue features articles around the G8 summit, the detention of refugees in Scotland and the exclusion of women from the politics of Northern Ireland alongside artwork by Glasgow-based artists Euan Sutherland and Jim Colquhoun.³⁵

The predictions being made here are by no means fanciful; they merely follow the trajectories of current cultural policy in the UK to their (il)logical conclusions. Rumbblings of discontent are becoming more audible among many disparate communities and alternatives are beginning to be sought. Much work needs to be done, on both a theoretical and practical level, to protect and sustain artistic autonomy for the future. But, there has never been a better time to start—in ten years' time, it will be too late.

1. The United Kingdom refers to the tenuous union between mainland Great Britain (England, Scotland, Wales) and the contested province of Northern Ireland.
2. Control of the following is reserved by the government in London: constitutional matters, UK foreign policy, UK defence and national security, fiscal, economic and monetary system, immigration and nationality, energy: electricity, coal, gas and nuclear energy, common markets, trade and industry, including competition and customer protection, some aspects of transport, including railways, transport safety and regulation, employment legislation, social security, gambling and the National Lottery, data protection, abortion, human fertilisation and embryology, genetics, xenotransplantation and vivisection, equal opportunities.
3. Tessa Jowell, 'Government and the Value of Culture', May 2004 (http://www.culture.gov.uk/global/publications/archive_2004).
4. David Edgar, *The Guardian*, 22 May 2004.
5. In his 2003 St Andrew's Day speech (<http://www.scottishexecutive.gov.uk/News/Releases/2003/11/4641>).
6. Published in August 2000 by the Scottish Executive, the National Cultural Strategy set out its four aims as follows:
 - Promote creativity, the arts, and other cultural activity
 - Celebrate Scotland's cultural heritage in its full diversity
 - Realise culture's potential contribution to education, promoting inclusion and enhancing people's quality of life
 - Assure an effective national support framework for culture (<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/nationalculturalstrategy/docs/cult-00.asp>).
7. Scottish Arts Council *Corporate Plan 2004–2009*, p. 8 (<http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/information/publications/1000271.aspx>).
8. Scottish Arts Council *Corporate Plan*, op cit, p. 17.
9. Cultural Policy Collective, *Beyond Social Inclusion: Towards Cultural Democracy*, 2004 (<http://www.culturaldemocracy.net>).
10. Bonnar Keenlyside, Making Their Mark: An Audit of Visual Artists in Scotland (<http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/information/publications/1000328.aspx>).
11. (<http://www.sau.org.uk>).
12. (<http://www.art-science.com/Aviss/au/au1.html>).

13. See Scottish Arts Council Visual Arts Strategy (2002–2007) (<http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/information/publications/1000772.aspx>).
14. See Scottish Arts Council Budget (2004–2005) (<http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/information/publications/1000358.aspx>).
15. (<http://www.culturalcommission.org.uk>).
16. Francis McKee, *Hearts and Minds in Scotland Now* (Edinburgh: Fruitmarket Gallery, 2004), p. 21.
17. John Pilger, 'The Great Game' in *New Rulers of the World* (London: Verso, 2002) p. 119.
18. This was well documented by Anthony Davies and Simon Ford in their trilogy of texts, 'Art Capital', 'Art Futures' and 'Culture Clubs' (<http://www.infopool.org.uk>) and by Chin Tao-wu in her book *Privatising Culture: Corporate Art Intervention since the 1980s* (London: Verso, 2002).
19. In Scotland, for example, this has seen corporate sponsors infiltrating the main exhibition venues e.g. Bloomberg at Edinburgh's Fruitmarket, Becks Beer at the Centre for Contemporary Art and Hiscox at Tramway (both Glasgow).
20. It has become customary for private consultants to be commissioned by Arts Councils to write their reports, employees of public funding bodies presumably lacking the objectivity or expertise.
21. Morris Hargreaves McIntyre, *Taste Buds: How to Cultivate the Art Market* (London: Arts Council England, October, 2004) p. 3 (http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/information/publication_detail.php?browse=recent&id=416).
22. Charlotte Higgins & Maev Kennedy, 'Arts funding freeze sparks fury', *The Guardian*, 14 December 2004.
23. Magnus Linklater, 'We all get singed when a quango burns', *The Times*, 15 December 2004.
24. £10,000 p.a. over the next three years. See <http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/information/publications/1000358.aspx> for 2004–2006 budgets.
25. £25,000 p.a.
26. See <http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/information/publications/1000408.aspx> for the 'How to Buy Art' leaflet.
27. (<http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/artsinscotland/visualarts/ownart.aspx>).
28. Currently £50,000 p.a. rising steadily to £51,500 in 2006, which represents 1.3% of the total visual arts budget (3,975,935 € in 2006).
29. Glasgow Art Fair (15–18 April, 2004) included Collective Gallery, The Embassy, EmergeD, Glasgow Sculpture Studios, Lapland, Limousine Bull, Market Gallery, Switchspace and Volume.
30. Ross Sinclair, 'Questions' in the catalogue for *Windfall*, an artist-initiated exhibition at the Seamen's Mission in Glasgow, 1991.
31. (<http://flaxmanlodge.omweb.org>).
32. The author was one of the initial thirty invitees and has participated in discussions.
33. See Ben Slater, 'Cube Culture: Exploding the frames of cinema in Bristol' in *Variant*, Volume 2, number 16, winter 2002, pp. 29–30.
34. See Jeremy Rifkin, 'Empowering the Third Sector' in *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labour Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), pp. 249–274.
35. See Gus Abraham 'The Saints of the Future', Tom Allan 'Freedom from Seizure' and Colin Graham 'not simply, relations of a man' respectively in *Variant* issue 23, Summer 2005.

A country in transition—to what?

Hectic, chaotic, full of all different kinds of ‘flows’, in the midst of these the capital, which is hardly a small city: Russia today is an outstanding example of a society in a state of transition. But a transition to what? There are various possible answers to this; prognoses for the future also vary accordingly.

Liberals would say, the transition is taking place from a ‘post-communist’ state of deregulation to a standardised capitalism. According to this logic, the faster we become members of WTO, the better. But the Russian market does not want to open its doors too widely to transnational corporations. For example, the ongoing discussion about building Russian IT-clusters like Bangalore is impeded by the fact that national companies do not want to invest in such clusters if foreign capital will dominate there. Therefore some other disputers would say the transition is taking place from a disastrous age of common destruction (‘Yeltsinism’) to a healthy and safe ‘national capitalism’. However, there are also some less obvious, more hidden streams in life and thought that can open up completely different perspectives, and we must also keep these in mind when thinking about the next decade.

Reality shows that while the intellectuals were just starting to conceptualise a shocking experience of the past decade, to unite disparate conclusions and to understand the situation in its complexity, a new mass culture of consumption had already been created and the new generation was raised on hi-tech commodities and MTV. This makes a transition complex and multi-layered and forces us, theoreticians and artists, good will activists and cognition workers, to think in multi-dimensional terms, focus on sophisticated scenarios, probe the feedback, experiment with some essentially new decisions. History is open, the future is not predetermined. And if art does not lead the way in an avant-garde of experiments, will it still be avant-garde art?

Integrative tendencies

The past year was celebrated with several events proving that Russia wants to be internationally accepted and integrated: 1st Moscow Biennial, 1st Russian Social Forum, and—from the government side—a bid from Moscow for the 2012 Olympic games. Whereas 2000–2003 brought the sweet taste of being included in the World Wide Web through the domestic appropriation of the flashmob, the consumerist use of hi-tech, etc., now Russia is pushing to establish connections and exchange with the rest of the world. The integration will probably take place. The 1st Moscow Biennial did not show an ‘export-import’ model of a peripheral art scene, but rather quite an intriguing and promising cultural exchange model: with the Soviet-style Lenin Museum hosting the central exposition and an international team of artists and curators wandering in a classic February snowstorm. Undoubtedly, Russia will begin speaking an international language within 3–5 years. This will result in a shift in the character of the international representation of Russian art.

For now the character of the representation of Russia abroad is that of ‘an image of an Other’, as the famous culture trader Marat Guelman pointed out. According to the leading authors from this contingent, ‘the Other’ of an international community must bark, piss, show bare ass etc. (see the works of Oleg Kulik and the ‘Blue noses’ group—recently the main Russian representatives abroad). Also, the current art scene is completely uninformed about the informational trends in the international art paradigm—even the ‘Moscow Art Magazine’, the main theoretical art edition, still can’t translate ‘open source’ appropriately. In his 2002 report on Moscow, Raimund Minichbauer also expressed a surprise at the absence of a digital artistic activism in Russia. I hope that in the future, as the young artists learn an international language, they will start discussing international questions and talk about the common problems of globalisation in a common language. In this way art will be enriched by connections to IT, self-organisation, networking, multidisciplinary, urbanism and other hot issues.

Values of the market and a re-evaluation of art

Under present conditions, integration often means more commercialisation, more capitalism. Especially because the art scene lacks almost any sources of ‘public funding’, which are grants, awards, stipends etc. (the only exception is a ‘Black square’ award amounting to 5,000 €, which was established last year and given only once to the young artist David Ter-Oganyan). The last Art Moscow Fair, which took place May 24–29th, showed that the art market is rising. More funds, awards, institutions will probably follow soon. The Russian middle class has grown enough to feed itself with works of domestic art producers, and there is a substantial number of managers and lawyers who offer cash to about a dozen high-rated lucky successors (Vinogradov&Dubossarsky, Kulik, Ragimov, AES...). Yulia Gnirenko, curator at the Moscow National Center for Contemporary Art, has observed that the average price for a piece has stabilised at a level of 3,000–5,000 €. This necessarily results in three clear historical consequences: • the flattening and de-conceptualisation of art (for example, the leading ‘artists for import’ are now Oleg Kulik and ‘Blue noses’, in whose works the content is diminished to a level of cartoons); • disappearance of the critic, who is not needed to sell the artworks. According to Yekaterina Dyogot, some new figure of a text-writing manager-promoter is welcomed instead; this means that the whole critical discourse disappears (which resulted in a lack of seminars, roundtables, open discussions at the Moscow Biennial); • and the emergence of a new avant-garde, which must inevitably arise from the margins of commercialism, of a capitalist society.

To explore this latter notion further, I must stress the paradox that is widespread in international contemporary art, namely that the language of an avant-garde which was created by the historical avant-garde (Malevich, Duchamp, Picasso, Dadaists, Actionists...) is now used by the people who do not fit the definition of an avant-garde because of their mentality, class identity and lifestyle. Yet a society that finds itself on the very edge of a gap between reality and

virtuality, between the old and the new, cannot afford to ignore the values of an avant-garde, of a societal interface between the traditional and an unknown. The avant-garde functions as an immune system of a society or as its nerves. It transmits information on pain or danger like axons transmit stimuli. I presume that the avant-garde as such has always existed in 20th century society, but was not identified as such (although certain artists operated in highly sensitive fields such as new technologies, political art, etc.). In contemporary Russia it must also be identified and fight to regain the dignity and substance of an artistic message (‘to recreate the syntax and measure of a poor human prose’, in Allen Ginsberg’s words).

OK, but where will it come from?

Centre-periphery: contradictions and attractions

Geographically, the new avant-garde is very likely to appear not from the capital, but from the periphery. Recent years have seen the appearance of many excellent young artists and artistic groups from the regions remote from Moscow and Saint Petersburg: Yekaterinburg (‘Kuda begut sobaki’, ‘Zer gut’), Nizhni Novgorod (‘Provmyza’, Nikolai Oleinikov), Izhevsk (‘Archeopteryx’), Kaliningrad (Karpenko sisters), Samara (Vladimir Logutov), Nizhni Tagil (‘Sistra’), Saratov, Novosibirsk, Perm... There are several reasons for this development: activities on the part of National Contemporary Art Centres (Yekaterinburg, Nizhni Novgorod, Kaliningrad; the Nizhni Novgorod NCCA director Lyubov Saprykina and ‘Provmyza’ were chosen this year to curate and design a Russian pavilion at the Venice Biennial); and an unwillingness of the leading Moscow curators to include these artists in a map of contemporary art.

But let’s focus first on the policies of a ‘centre’, which will be, in our case, specifically the Moscow National Center for Contemporary Art (NCCA). It was established in 1992 by the curator Leonid Bazhanov and is funded by the Ministry of Culture. It closely cooperates with the Ministry of Culture, Government of Moscow and a state office ROSIZO, which

served as an organisational node institution for the Moscow Biennial. These institutions also make important decisions about personalities; for instance, they appoint curators for the Venice Biennial Russian Pavilion. NCCA conducts studies and exhibition projects, acting under the patronage of the state. But its policy, for now, can hardly be called definite: NCCA focuses on 'middle level' artistic activities, supporting a very broad spectrum of artists and groups and prioritising mainly 'museum values'. In terms of the centre-periphery problem, it prefers to show Moscow artists in the province instead of the reverse, showing provincial artists in Moscow.

This is why the role of the regional NCCAs is growing in significance. They establish horizontal connections, not vertical. They prefer associating with each other directly, with no mediation from Moscow. To me it seemed a very refreshing sign to be invited to a regional Izhevsk Urban Sculpture Festival in Autumn 04 and to get in touch there with young artists from Samara and Yekaterinburg, with whom the Izhevsk organisers closely cooperate. It is not the institutions that play a leading role in this process, but committed individuals, who might also be a part of institutions such as Yevgeny Umansky, a Kaliningrad NCCA art director (whose role in establishing the Yekaterinburg-Kaliningrad 'axis' is outstanding), the 'Archeopteryx' group from Izhevsk (the Urban Sculpture Festival organizers), and others.

When the Moscow NCCA was just created, its statutes provided for the existence of only four regional branches. This is disappointing, because in the meantime Novosibirsk and several other cities eagerly want NCCAs in their locations as well. At the same time, the fortunate four cities are excellently developing their centres. In 2004 the Nizhni Novgorod branch received a huge historical tower from the municipal government as its property. This is a great success. Artists and curators believe that contemporary art will now firmly withstand the State&Church obscurantist tendencies simply by the way it is positioned. The Nizhni Novgorod triumph was further enhanced, when its NCCA director Lyubov Saprykina was—almost simultaneously—appointed the

Russian Pavilion curator in Venice, and immediately selected Nizhni Novgorod artists, the 'Provmyza' duet (Sergey Provorov and Galina Myznikova), to arrange the main exposition there. In addition, the young Moscow group 'Escape' and the young Moscow architect Konstantin Larin were also invited.

Progressive policies of another kind are currently emerging from Kaliningrad—the Western edge of Russia now almost separated from national unity. The Kaliningrad NCCA is, for example, the place where BioMediale was published—a unique and brilliant international publication dedicated to a critical view of bio—and nano-technologies in art, edited by the Kaliningrad NCCA curator Dmitry Bulatov. Kaliningrad NCCA's art-director Yevgeny Umansky establishes multiple connections between local artists and art centers all across the country, initiates projects and conferences (partnering mainly with the Yekaterinburg NCCA and Yekaterinburg State University), and now he and the Moscow NCCA curator Yulia Gnirenko have started an all-Russian project called 9000 (9000km is the distance between Eastern and Western edges of Russia), which will invite local curators to formulate some questions specific to their regions and involve local artists in projects dedicated to them.

To add some important points and link this topic to the aforementioned notion of a new avant-garde, I would like to briefly discuss the characteristics of a newly emerging regional art. In my opinion, it belongs to a new generation of artists who will be active in the coming decade. It might be considered the appearance of a 'lost generation'—of those who were born in mid-70s, lived through the age of perestroika and early 90s, and only now start to test their voices. If we look closely at some of the works by these new artists, we find that they are working with some highly unusual material. In many cases, it is not a work conveying one linear message or using one well-known form, as in the works of today's 'star' artists. It is more of an attempt to tap into the mysterious multi-dimensional processes opened up to us by the development of new technologies and an appearance of new life forms. It might be said that they do not work with

linear messages, but with models. Some artists, like the Karpenko sisters from Kaliningrad, do not even make their works as art pieces, but as forms of their mutual reactions to an external space, imitating some new collective lifeform. And the 'Kuda begut sobaki' ('Where the dogs run to') group from Yekaterinburg creates multidisciplinary research and models such as a 'Digitalisation of water': a glass pyramid was built from small concentrically organised cups, and a water stream flowing from below could fill each cup and fall left (0) or right (1). The data documenting the 'water's choice' were transmitted to a computer, which then transformed them into graphics and musics.

The second capital

Saint Petersburg has always been considered 'a second capital' of the national cultural scene, or its inhabitants even used to regard it as the 'cultural capital', as opposed to Moscow as the 'political capital'. In fact, the opposition could be described in this way: Saint Petersburg insists on the 'purity' of art, while Moscow mixes aesthetic issues with concepts, politics etc. This has resulted in the establishment of a certain kind of art: in Saint Petersburg the 'neo-academist' wave born in late 1980s achieved considerable recognition. For example, as the artist Nora Konyonkova tells it, 'artists go to vernissages from the Hermitage to the Russian Museum'.

Nevertheless, the Saint Petersburg scene never gained influence in Moscow and is usually considered provincial. More recently something unexpected has happened: a group was born in the Northern capital which is very explicitly oriented to the Moscow conceptual/political scene, an artistic newspaper 'Chto delat'?' ('What's to be done?'), claiming to continue traditions of Moscow radicalism. It is still lacking a clear platform, but it signals that the way the Saint Petersburg art scene will develop is unpredictable. It will come out of personal involvements and contributions unseen by sociological surveys.

Regulatory/counter-regulatory tendencies

The story of the trial of 'Caution, religion!' (January 2003–February 2005) is helpful for understanding how contemporary art may operate under the conditions of a reactionary ideological domination in an authoritarian state. The exhibition 'Caution, religion!' took place at the Moscow Andrey Sakharov Center and Museum—a highly politically engaged space struggling against the Chechen War and pursuing a human rights agenda. It is not a usual place for contemporary art gatherings, although sometimes events and exhibitions take place there. The exhibition 'Caution, religion!' involved about a dozen artists, young and unknown artists along with established ones. It was dedicated to the growing presence of the Orthodox church in our everyday lives and to its social interventions such as school manuals advocating creationist theory, public expressions of religious intolerance etc. I must note that the art pieces were not very tolerant either, and some believers also considered them offensive. Two days after the exhibition opening a group from the Orthodox Church came to destroy and vandalise the exhibition. They were arrested on site, but due to a lack of appeals on the part of the artists, they were all released, and the court case was soon opened against the Sakharov Center director Yuri Samodurov, curator Lyudmila Vassilovskaya, and one of the artists, Anna Alchuk, who was also accused of some organisational support. They were charged with the 'violation of religious feelings'.

The court hearings proceeded for more than six months and were followed by many publications and discussions, and in the course of them it became clear that the art community mostly prefers to stay apart from a direct involvement. Even though the end of the hearings coincided with the 1st Moscow Biennial, there was no sign of solidarity given to the prosecuted (while the opposing side was strongly consolidated). The final decision was much less harsh than the sentence demanded by the state prosecutors: a fine of 100,000 rubles (approx. 3,000 €) for each of the Sakharov Center administrators and the dismissal of charges against Anna Alchuk.

The case demonstrated that the art community fears regulatory interventions. For the major community, the trial was a threat from the most reactionary societal forces—state, police and church. It was also considered a threat by leading curators, who noticed that those who appeared before the court were not artists but curators. Similar threats and fears are present everywhere, especially in regional centres like Yekaterinburg, where they have a large and aggressive Orthodox community.

If we consider only these developments, the prognoses for the future should become utterly pessimistic. We can presuppose a further strengthening of cultural policies, commercialisation, etc. No one can predict what may happen in the future, especially under conditions that are unbalanced, unstable, non-linear; and as Ilya Prigogine showed, there is a strong prospect of fluctuations.

However, it is also very likely that the social changes will take place. There are even some indications that crucial changes could take place in the immediate future. If this happens, the governmental party replacing the present one will not be ideal either, of course, but undoubtedly this will become a much more free and open society. And there are several tendencies which I expect to flourish under these new conditions.

On a conceptual level, I think there should not only be an appropriation of Western ideas (concepts of ‘public domain’, ‘networking’, ‘art & activism’ etc.), but also a re-thinking of the Soviet heritage. If, as Boris Buden maintains, there is no place for leftist ideas in the contemporary European East—because now it can only function as ‘another imported trend’—then the Russian left must find its leftist idea anew.

This understanding is necessarily buried deep under the surface of our present currents, but it will provide an extreme impetus. We still do not understand well what a heritage of rich conceptual variety communism has left us, and a new generation of intellectuals is only starting to explore it. For example, the Soviet sci-fi of the 1960s demonstrated some completely new approaches to future modeling, technological

development, utopianism (Yefremov; Strugatsky brothers...); art formulated new understandings of ‘public sphere’ and ‘artist-society’ interrelations (Eisenstein; Yevtushenko; art magazines of the 60s; or socialist art in other countries, like Siqueiros in Mexico); the anti-capitalist critic of the 1920s (Mayakovsky, the Constructivists) is still valuable as is Alexandra Collontay’s feminist perspective, etc. I think that a new non-postmodernist type of intellectual will be born, who will freely operate with both Western and Eastern, contemporary and historical doctrines, recombining and synthesising them.

This can potentially catalyse further social changes. And I suppose that in the course of these changes the positive trends which I have briefly outlined will receive a far stronger development. Information awareness, horizontal networking, civil society institutions, the public sphere will grow and involve more and more concentric circles in society. For art this will mean deepening and sophistication, and maybe—paradoxically—finally, the creation of an autonomous territory of art.

Conclusion

There has always been a recognisable desynchronisation in the tempo of the respective development of Russia and the global economy. Russian thinkers have dedicated a multitude of books to this gap which resulted in a need to ‘catch up with’ global developments, or for modernisation (one of the most remarkable of these books is Boris Kagarlitsky’s recent *Peripheral Empire*). Industrial modernisation was accomplished in the 1930s under Stalin, and the country paid a high price for it. As Manuel Castells points out in *The Information Age*, the Soviet Union had started its way to a collapse in the 1970s, when the ruling elite proved incapable of restructuring the economy so that it would be able to compete with the fast-growing Western information economy. The Russian ‘informational modernisation’ is underway now, and the most pressing question is who will direct it and how. In the course of this modernisation, contemporary art can be a

useful tool, or an ‘agent of change’, as Konrad Becker would call it.

Under the present conditions, in the sociological trends in contemporary art should be described as: integration with the West; professionalisation; commercialisation. However, there are also contrary trends, which I group under the label ‘new avant-garde’. In the case of crucial social changes, the latter will replace the former and give rise to new developments.

In both scenarios, though, contemporary art can play an important role in establishing civil society and functioning as an interface between intellectuals and the public. Regardless of how artists operate, they represent cosmopolitan, reasoned policy as an antidote to mere reaction.

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FROM SELF-ORGANIZING TOWARDS PROGRESSIVE CULTURAL POLICIES

Branka Ćurčić

Culture and art have never been marginalised from power, and we can especially see this in a time when we can observe the rise of cultural industries, economic globalisation and market based monopolies that do not disregard the field of culture.

The diversification of cultural production has been changed into a corporatisation of culture that is based on interest and avoids any question of socially based relations. ‘This cultural production strategy is significantly turning to the political right’.¹ It has become an orthodoxy to think of culture and economy as operating together in a very general sense—this is blatantly expressed in arts and business funding opportunities for cultural activity, as well as in so-called ‘enterprise culture’.² Often it looks like the process of regulating cultural policies is actually an integral part of the capital apparatus. Still, in the landscape of regulated European cultural policies and mostly capital-led cultural production, art and culture need to regain their role of legitimising social and humanistic values.

Site-Specific Conflict Policies

The cultural space of the former Yugoslavian states has been influenced by different cultural strategies of different state regimes. This influence started with the cultural policy of the Yugoslav Kingdom, which was based on the strong dependence of artists on state services. This influence continued with the Soviet administrative and state based idea of socialist culture after World War II, and into a period of a slight ‘westernisation’ and decentralisation of cultural activities after 1950. At the end of the nineties, measures taken for the region’s economic and political ‘normalisation’ produced a need for a new national cultural policy. The instability that marks the economic and political scene in Serbia and Montenegro has been inherited by the field of culture as is evident in the state institutions’ insufficient ability to deal with the demands of the transitional period.

It seems like there are some unexpected similarities between the ignorant attitude towards cultural production present in the predatory breakthrough of neoliberal capitalism and the state's awareness of the necessity of a good and functional cultural policy. There is a concrete example of conflict led politics and copyright law penetration into the region that is visible within the process of European Union integration on May 1st 2004. 'The copyright industry has claimed that some East European countries have an economic interest in copyright infringement and that they do not have the will to enforce Intellectual Property laws that will be damaging to them economically.' That was the excuse for the EU to finish a new intellectual property directive by accession time, 'so that East European countries won't have an opportunity to participate in its design'.³ We should start from the point of view that copyright regulations, ownership and the modes of the distribution of cultural products is a centrally important part of the regulation of the cultural field, so that state insufficiency is evident in the practical implementation of these regulations. Specifically, copyright law in Serbia was enforced more aggressively as a part of the packages of criminal laws introduced during the state of emergency after the assassination of the prime minister in 2003. These laws have been enforced occasionally, but most often when some international funds have been promised and are about to be received.

Cultural diversity has become a synonym for cross-disciplinary work and the intersection of different fields of social, political, economic and art theories and practices. In Serbia and Montenegro the cultural field is often neglected without the need to reconsider any of the existing aspects of commercial or non-profit cultural production. On the other hand, social, educational and economic programmes are progressing much faster, gaining the role of more important, legitimate and more relevant aspects of contemporary society. In Serbia, economic reforms are run through cooperation with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and similar organisations that partly secure 'financial stability, facilitate

international trade and promote high employment and sustainable economic growth'.⁴ It's very difficult to expect that in the cultural field, the IMF would encourage cooperation that would result in anything other than a well regulated 'enterprise culture'.

Almost all state funded and independent cultural institutions primarily operate with a microscopic impact and on a short-term basis with regard to mutual cooperation, collaborative production, funding and international networks. There are some models that give a different perspective to Serbian cultural strategies and developments. There are some independently funded cultural institutions whose primary activity is art production, but which deal at the same time with 'unpopular', or rather informal ways of education, successfully connecting those two fields. Some of those informal ways of education are, for example, 'hands on' workshops about Free Software focused on different target groups: pupils, students, artists, journalists, etc. Some examples of these independent organisations are REX—Cultural Center of B92 from Belgrade, New Media Center_kuda.org from Novi Sad, Center for Contemporary Art from Belgrade and Multimedia Institute from Zagreb.⁵ On the other hand, these institutions are actually performing the role one would expect of state funded institutions, often running educational programmes, which are not in their specific focus of action, but which are still certainly needed. These examples must not remain isolated in the future. They must have a high degree of communication with different projects and different institutions, especially with official cultural institutions, whose voice is still heard by the government although their operability has been atrophied.

A certain absurdity adheres to the public funding of these institutions. Governmental cultural institutions are passive in this situation, and they rely completely on state funds, which are given to them by inertia. There is no need for any change, any adjustment of their activities according to governmental reports and evaluations of their work. Thoughtful evaluation is usually lacking and this could be seen as a part of the non-existent, overall cultural development strategy.

Unlike these governmental institutions, government supported, independent institutions and individuals have to fight for public funds, to apply constantly without any guarantee that they will receive funding. Again, the stability of their funding does not depend on evaluation processes and actual results of their projects, but rather on their persistence in constant negotiations with governmental bodies. That is one of the reasons why independent cultural institutions are, in many cases, turning to international funding sources, foreign cultural centres in their own countries, embassies, etc. Again, the most unenviable position is the position of the independent artist. As individuals, they can usually ensure modest funds coming from specific funders that include support for individual artists in their funding strategy. An example of this modest funding for artists is found in the way the Pro Helvetia office in Serbia and Montenegro works. Some independent artists are trying to gain private, commercial funds as another option. But, in order to ensure some public funds for their projects, independent artists are usually required to position their work in relation to either a governmental or an independent institution; to present themselves as a part of collective, collaborative work or as part of a network of many different actors within the project.

Consensus and Cooperation

In order to influence the future planning of more structural cultural policies, there is a need for more constructive cooperation between independent centres and governmental agencies. In the past, these kinds of projects were realised occasionally and on a short-term bases, with a lack of a more structural cooperation. There is an example of this kind of cooperation between the Information Technology and Internet Agency—an official body of the Ministry for Science, Technology and Development of the Republic of Serbia—and the independent organisation New Media Center_kuda.org. In 2003, they worked together to successfully realise the exhibition ‘World-Information.Org’ in Serbia and Montenegro.⁶ This model of cooperation is feasible and viable, if there are

common interests and an awareness of its importance for the different parties and for the development of this model. Part of the problem here is that the initiative for a model of cooperation like this will usually only come from independent organisations and not from governmental agencies.

Collaboration should be based on consensus—the practice of basing policies on what will gain wide support. Of course, there also has to be a consensus about the consensus, meaning that some basic rules for mutual collaborative work must be established. In the field of visual arts, abstractions should be replaced with more concrete examples of individual-institutional cooperation, which is fostered from both sides. Inevitably this discussion would include artists, independent art initiatives, art institutions, educational institutions, funders, and media representatives, as well as social, economic and political researchers, in order to raise massive public debate about the subject. However, before that discussion can take place, a certain level of self-organising has to be achieved. During the 1990s, the state based association of artists from socialist Yugoslavia eroded into formal, non-functional and ‘existing just on paper’ organisations. There is one exception, the association of artists from Belgrade that did organise themselves independently and won back the basic regulation of social and health insurance that had not existed since the beginning of Yugoslavia’s deterioration by negotiating with political decision makers.

Many, Self-Organised Voices

In the present, generally non-regulated state in Serbia and Montenegro, it is difficult to predict the future modes of artistic and cultural funding. A guess is that state finances will stay slightly planned and based on the inertia of giving ‘small pieces of the cake’ to hundreds of institutions, in order to maintain the status quo. In contrast to that, the major structural funds will still be provided through international public funds based on extremely regulated cultural policies. Still, there are examples and there is the conviction that

a certain level of self-organisation and self-management of artists-individuals around similar, recognised interests could present foundations for much stronger associations that could significantly influence mainstream policies. One example of this self-management is the Novi Sad city network of independent cultural organisations and individuals called 'Dizalica'.⁷ This network is created as a multifunctional platform, that should act as a 'public voice' through different political and artistic public actions on the one hand, and on the other, to act as a kind of council body influencing the creation of the city's cultural policy.

'There are some steps that every individual or group that wants to liberate itself has to take. First, you have to dismantle the instruments of domination, you have to abandon the idea of using them for better things... you have to find alternative ways of cooperation and negotiation...'⁸ For a long time, art practice has been considered an individual activity. In the present, complex art system that relates to different aspects of contemporary society and networks of power, there is a need for cooperation and connection in temporary and informal groups in order to achieve common aims based on common interests. One of these common interests is the regulation of funding strategies. Many voices are always more influential than one, individual voice. Therefore, negotiating with decision makers as a group rather than as individuals will have more chances to potentially influence the development of policies that are in the interest of artists.

Individuals and independent art associations should preserve their status of being 'innovators' and producers of open policies, constantly appealing, proposing and performing different models that will achieve a balance between vivid communication and cooperation and state based cultural and educational institutions.

Recently, there have been many proposals for a more specific tactic of 'anti-culture' or subversive art and cultural production that also has a good chance of being universally understood. It seems that it is 'no longer enough to

incorporate some actualities in the artistic statements, than rather to detonate, challenge those actualities'.⁹ But, there is always a slight fear that progressive tactics and strategies as well as cultural policies could be easily absorbed, digested and adjusted into the capital led system. This could also be seen as a process of applying the principle of 'corporate social responsibility' to the field of cultural production, which would turn more radical social and cultural changes into nothing more than correctness.

A clear distinction should be made between those aspects of cultural production that need to stay non-profit and those that are already seeking direct profit, meaning that there is a need for education in the way that the art market functions for all of those parties that play some role in it. This level of complex collaborative work should result in the turn from an art market as the most important regulator of aesthetics and trends in the art field, to a more human and more socially based art of representation.¹⁰

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Before embarking on any possible scenarios concerning the future of cultural policies, it's necessary to note specifically that a 'Belgian cultural policy' *stricto sensu* does not and will never exist. Yet, cultural policies operate on the Belgian territory, but via a complex constitutional frame that has been cleansed of any references to 'Belgium'. Successive waves of constitutional reforms continue to strip the state of its prerogative and distribute them to increasingly separated and autonomous entities.¹ The Belgian federal 'pie' is therefore sliced according to linguistic and territorial delimitations. As matter of fact, the territorial division and the linguistic one do not match and create a problematic power overlap that leads to frequent cultural skirmishes in Brussels, where both Flemish and French communities can implement their own cultural strategy. This cultural 'dynamic' largely echoes the political debate, the pace of which is determined by the fantasy of an imminent cultural clash. Orchestrated by the Flemish fascist party Vlaamse Belang, formerly know as Vlaams Blok, this political simulacrum is also fueled by democratic parties that keep the political agenda focused on the same inescapable questions of constitutional autonomy and cultural identity.² Undoubtedly, the typical French/Flemish confrontation lingers on as an encumbering vestige of the past, incapable of coping with the multicultural and multilingual nature of present society, especially in cities like Brussels. Indeed, it obstructs a proper cultural development and nourishes the withdrawal of identity and the xenophobic social climate. However, less spectacular yet more powerful transformations of structural political patterns are presently at work. They will probably have deeper impacts on the working and living conditions of artists and cultural operators in the future than the over-emphasised Belgian bi-cultural regime. This paper examines a few of them in an attempt to sketch plausible scenarios for the future.

Stakhanovists or Smugglers

A recent survey has shown that only 4% of the general

income of Belgian artists comes from public cultural funding (whether linked to exhibitions in public art spaces or individual grants).³ The greatest source of funding for visual arts remains the artists themselves, who finance their activity mainly via jobs outside the art field or thanks to their partner's support... The second source comes from social security and unemployment benefits, which represent more than 25% of their revenues. In that respect, the recent strategy of the Federal State, which aims to limit and ultimately suppress unemployment benefits for the 'surplus' of job seekers, is a much more preoccupying issue for artists than any possible developments solely in cultural policies. Of course the progressive dismantling of the unemployment regime is not a Belgian specificity and can be observed in all European countries, but a sudden acceleration of the process has been perceptible.⁴ Since 2000 on, post-Thatcherist dogmas have shaped an array of measures affecting the whole social and unemployment system. The latest one to date forces job seekers to sign evaluation contracts stipulating the loss of their unemployment benefits if their performance in seeking employment is deemed insufficient. This evaluation is entirely left to the discretion of civil servants. Beyond the wholly partial and iniquitous character of the procedure in general, it appears arguably inappropriate to appraise artistic working conditions and the effort of unemployed artists to find a job.

In compensation, a so-called 'artist statute' was issued recently in Belgian federal law. It secures a regular income (maximum +/-1,000 € monthly) for artists (and to some extent cultural workers, curators and technicians) and recognises the seasonality and the financial insecurity of the art practice.⁵ Nevertheless, the alleged victory obtained by platforms/unions of artists with the recognition of a specific statute is a sort of fiction. Not only because the social protection it provides is weak, but first and foremost because the set of criteria that allows artists to get this social benefit corresponds to activities that have more to do with creative industries, advertisement and communication than with artistic work. To get it, the artist has to prove a minimum

of 16.000 € of income during a period of 18 months or the equivalent of 312 days of employment for the same period. If some performing arts professionals and musicians can follow this Stakhanovist rhythm via an extensive touring system, it's more problematic for visual artists whose working environment is determined by different cycles. The incompatibility of the law is so obvious that it encourages its own hijacking: in the recent past, artists have frequently given money to their cultural employers to issue a 'legal' contract amounting to the income they needed to get the required quota. Bluntly put: artists will have to pay to get jobs. This absurd setting is about to become normative in the coming years, hence what can be genuinely called a *hunt* for 'fake' job seekers (artists or not) will be massively put into action. On the private side of the spectrum, the belief that the high density of collectors in Belgium counterbalances the lack of public money is deeply rooted in the Belgian artistic sphere. This is partially true, but only for the few artists who manage to keep a position at the fertile—but constantly moving—cross section of supply and demand curves. Besides, the private collectors as well as corporate investors are certainly contributing more to the intermediaries (galleries, art consultants and dealers) than to the artists themselves.

We can imagine the future artistic panorama as a combination of two groups. On one hand, an expending mass of artists blurred by the romantic idea that the arts will always be a suffering yet protected area among the debris of the welfare state. Those will be obliged to obey the imperative of creative industries or to commit fraud in order to benefit from a temporary and ever renegotiable statute. On the other hand, a limited cluster of artists in the upper income brackets will provide the national and international art market with their works.

The End of Cultural Democracy

If we leave aside the preposterous set-up from which individual cultural producers will have to extricate themselves in a near future and look at cultural policies in their ambition

to sustain contemporary art practices, the landscape is not much more appealing. At this stage, I will focus on the case of French community, hence the dead ends are arguably more revealing than in Flanders with respect to the problematic issue of contemporary arts. One can hardly speak of a real policy as far as contemporary visual arts are concerned: it would suppose clear orientations and objectives as well as sufficient budget provisions. In the French community, the budget for visual arts amounts 3.17 million €. If the structural subsidies to the MAC (Musée d'Art Contemporain, 1.5 million €) and the 14 other recognised contemporary art associations (1.17 million €) are subtracted, 500.000 € are left available for non-recognised associations, exhibitions and support to individual artists.⁶ With 1 € per inhabitant allocated to visual arts, it's superfluous to mention that public subsidies are totally insufficient to stimulate any ambitious development and all the predictions confirm that the budget will remain steadily fixed to the current settings.

Considering this, one could suspect that public authorities continue to limit their support in the hope that the market will somehow bridge the gap and leave the floor to more or less enlightened private entrepreneurs, like in the 19th century, or to the emerging 'culturally concerned' or 'citizen' corporations. However, Belgium belongs to those decaying welfare states where cultural affairs are still the state's (or more precisely communities') responsibility. Yet, they must adapt to the contemporary dominant neo-liberal pattern. Therefore the question is not to wonder whether the market will compensate for a lack of public investments, but rather to examine how public policies have become market-led instruments and to consider the possible impact of this mutation on the visual art field in the future.

One of the most prominent ideological pillars of the cultural set-up in Belgium has been cultural democracy. Up until now, it has offered—at least theoretically—resistance to the neo-liberal trends that have been observable in other and more developed cultural superstructures in Europe. Cultural democracy is inspired by the politico-libidinal streams that

irrigated the aftermath of 68. Due to legislature from the early 70s provoked by cultural democracy, public authorities are obliged to support and promote the cultural expression of social emancipation and political contestation. In this sense, culture is no longer a matter of taste and edification that suggests politics, it's what gives access to it.

The poor allotment to the contemporary arts was to some extent counterbalanced by the possibilities that were made available by the horizontal deployment of cultural democracy within the cultural funding system. On the basis that it was targeting social or political emancipation objectives, any cultural association—whatever media it used—was entitled to access the public funds, notably via the 'adult education' sector.⁷ This scheme functioned like a kind of ballast for a multitude of initiatives that were against the petit-bourgeois art system and wanted to build up their own spaces, methods and audiences. So it not only compensated the lack of funds in the arts, it also promoted rather interesting practices outside the art establishment, such as alternative radio stations, cinemas, small cultural centres, independent architectural collectives, fanzines and cultural activist groups. Although the freezing of cultural expenses caused by the economic crisis of the 90s progressively reduced the possibilities, non-structural and limited budgets were still available without too much effort due to the loopholes of the system. This permanent do-it-yourself strategy sustained the 'alternative' art scene that characterises Belgium and Brussels in particular. Unlike what happens to similar practices in countries like France, small-scale art spaces and collectives were able to survive without being absorbed by the cultural establishment or being bought out by hype marketers.

The recasting of the whole cultural regime recently launched by the Minister of Culture of the French community of Belgium will produce new legal and administrative devices that will almost totally suppress any possibilities for those cultural initiatives to access public funding in the future and to preserve their autonomy. In what way?

Firstly by professionalising the art sector, which is one of

the priorities of the reform. However, the proposed solutions for this do not suggest increasing the budget in order to sustain regular jobs, but rather forcing associations to spend 50% of the subsidies for wages and to have at least one employee. This is hardly understandable as a measure that protects employment, since the fixed minimum wage for the sector is consequently very low (+/-1,100 € for a full time equivalent) and has automatically become the standard wage in the sector. Many critical art practices based on a kind of gift economy that temporally gathers volunteers with no expectations of making a wage or a profit are de facto excluded.

Secondly, the conditions that the reformed policy assigns to applicant associations are tailor-made for 'cultural sub-contractors' that can provide cost-efficient and specialised services. A new breed of cultural operators that has been forged in the arena of cultural management courses will replace the typical 'leftist' cultural workers. Those professionals, active since the early 90s with the collapse of public services in Great Britain, are surfacing at the moment in Belgium and start to hunt for the most profitable 'niches' within the cultural market. Cities or provinces are already appointing satellite associations to manage parts or all of their art programmes. It's not unrealistic to imagine that in a very near future private organisms will also supervise the management of public cultural budgets. This will of course entail a lack of accountability regarding the way public funds are spent and prevent any sort of contestation, hence the association is totally free to spend the funds according to its own set of criteria. In that sense, the slow but sure 'outsourcing' of public responsibility outside the representational democratic arena is not to be interpreted as a step towards the art field's autonomy from political intervention. On the contrary. Instead of supporting multiple and contradictory micro initiatives coming from the field, political authorities will decide on a cultural agenda and then subcontract its implementation to organisations that will simply carry out their orders.

Thirdly, the educational value embedded in its original concept is revamped in a blatant neo-liberal style. It will foster some kind of permanent vocational training intended to help workers and job-seekers to adapt to the rapidly changing demands of the labor market. The notions of self constitutive and critical knowledge that formerly prevailed will be wiped out. As a consequence, the artistic groups producing subversive documentaries, the architecture collectives that were fighting against the privatisation of public spaces in the city or any artistic project with political intent, will become ineligible unless they prove a strong commitment to 'train' people and re-orient them to the successful path of employment.

The Minister of Culture recently declared 'Culture is the best weapon of mass destruction against barbarism'. The Minister's declaration is ultimately based on the idea that citizens are by definition constantly and hectically trying to destroy social linkage, trash public wealth, abuse social security and dive into fascism. It definitely sealed the fate of cultural democracy and re-enacted almost literally the outmoded belief that goes back to Malraux and French cultural decentralisation. That model proposed to the uneducated audience—provincial people, potentially barbarians—the masterpieces of civilised—Parisian—society that should inspire ethic values and help people discriminate civilisation from barbarism, democratic governments from dictatorships, etc.

The future of cultural policies will develop according to a reverse-engineered process that will bring us back to a period prior to 1968. From a sardonic point of view, one could invoke the 'democratic distemper' syndrome to explain how what was once triggered and fueled by public policy has become too slippery and uneasy to control. Corrective methods will be legitimated by the immanent danger of the dismemberment of a formerly unified social body. For the sake of a coalition against fascism and nationalism, this new matrix will hold back and then suppress any experimentation outside parliamentary democracy. Nobody knows whether the

emerging forms of social protests that have been witnessed all over the world and which will be extremely active in Brussels in the coming years will be judged as barbarians or not.⁸ The present political arena still hesitates to stigmatise and exclude them or to incorporate them in their sphere of control. What is undoubtedly clear is that the reform of the cultural policies will decouple those movements from any publicly funded cultural organisations or programmes.

According to the think tank of experts surrounding the reform, the global transformation of the whole cultural apparatus should end in 2015. That coincides with the year that has been chosen to present Mons, the main city of the most deprived region of Belgium, as the European Cultural Capital. In order to prepare the city and its region for a possible selection, massive investments have already been poured into cultural infrastructures. European Structural Funds that will be allocated to enhance the attractiveness of the zone have already financed the recent implantation of the biggest contemporary art centres of the French community in the region.⁹ In addition, nine of the fourteen other art venues are situated in the same perimeter. This high concentration is not intended to satisfy the inhabitants' extraordinary appetite for contemporary art, but rather to occupy the leisure time of newcomers: white-collar employees that will come along with enterprises that will install their facilities in the *eurometropolis*.

In reality, these contemporary art spaces will be integrated in a more global development programme that aims at re-qualifying the region for private investors. They will belong to a vaster deployment plan that will assign them the role of cultural magnets in the hinterland between the two big conurbations of Lille (North of France) and Brussels. Alongside with favorable fiscal (tax shelters, subsidies) and infrastructural (roads, equipments) incentives, the fully fledged art offer will culturally contribute to the regional revival. This instrumentalisation of culture in economic frames will therefore be different from the one that, in the late 80s, wanted to allocate its potential to generate new jobs to replace those lost with the decline of heavy industries. The

new spatialisation process that is actually taking place in Europe is pushed by capitalistic movements that distribute its production centres, logistic knots and creative hubs according to new delimitations. This global reshuffling of the map will have nothing to do with national markers anymore, but with parameters produced by specific European legislation and/or favorable local conditions. This will determine future hot spots, rebalancing not only the Belgian art landscape but also the whole geographic equilibrium of the European art scene.

Belgium, which has been in some way spared from the 'creative city' ideology that has produced cultural malls such as MuseumsQuartier in Vienna or that has marketed entire cities like Barcelona as multicultural parks, will shortly experience for the first time a 'culturetainment' drift at a relatively large scale. The challenge for cultural policies in Belgium will consist in fulfilling the desires of new corporate employees in their purported craving for art on the one side and the public authorities' ambitions to purge the convalescent social body from barbarians on the other. Contemporary art will operate as part of the many public apparatuses that will subtly interface those two missions in politically neutralised and economically ruled brand new infrastructures.

Backlashes are expected for Mons 2015, European Cultural Capital of the Year. Let's hope the art collectives that will be entirely excluded from public cultural funds by that time will be able to connect with other precarious groups from Mons and elsewhere, which have been expelled from all the public spheres for a longer period. They will have a lot to discuss, but certainly not the programme of those new cultural shopping centres that will, at that time, not even pretend to be made for them.

1. Belgium is linguistically composed of 5.9 million Flemish speakers, 4.1 million French and 75 thousand German speakers. Each of these linguistic groups is equipped with a fully fledged constitutional body called Community comprising: parliament, government, administration (only justice remains a federal competence).
2. Vlaams Blok was judged a racist party by a Belgian court last year. It therefore had to dissolve. The same week after the judgement, the former Vlaams Blok political apparatus was entirely reconstituted and baptised 'Vlaamse Belang'. In the recent

elections VB obtained 25% of the votes, continuing its regular progression. It's the first Flemish political party in Antwerp (800.000 habitants) and Brussels. It has an equal or slightly higher number of supporters than all the major political parties in Flanders. In order to keep it away from government, Flemish parties have to converge into a large coalition.

3. Annick Bijmens and NICC, 'The social and economic situation of visual artists above the age of 45; a proposal for policy-related solutions'. Although the methodological approaches are not completely satisfying, the research addresses a range of artists with sufficient experience in the field to be relevant (<http://www.nicc.be/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=419>).
4. The legacy of social rights that has been lukewarmly respected up till now has been substituted by more liberal patterns. Belgium has a heavy industrial past punctuated by violent union-led strikes, this strong historical legacy has been progressively swept out by liberal and new fashioned socialist governments. Guy Verhofstadt, who has been Prime Minister since 1999, is called 'baby Thatcher'.
5. In reality, it's an adaptation of a pre-existing legal disposal designed for seasonal workers such as harvesters and wood cutters... This is why it is frequently nicknamed 'woodcutter statute'.
6. In Flanders, approximately 6 million € are spent annually for the visual arts, out of which 750,000 € are directly provided to artists (grants, personal project, etc). Complete figures can be found on internet (<http://www.forumculture.be>).
7. Adult education was the translation of the principle of cultural democracy in the budget lines of the Ministry of Culture. Remarkably large funds are put to this purpose, to such extent that 'adult education' became the second largest apportionment of the cultural budget.

8. Since the European Council of Ministers (the Euro-top) is systematically held in the city, that will bring large scale demonstration and protest action from different altermondialist groups and cultural activists.
9. Musée d'Art Contemporain—Grand Hornu.

THE FUTURE OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE 'CULTURAL NATION' OF GERMANY

Cornelia Sollfrank

For several years now, the Federal Republic of Germany has found itself in a serious economic and political crisis. Now, sixteen years after reunification, the dwarf that defined itself by its economic success no longer knows where to draw its self-assurance from. The mood in the economy is depressive, people feel insecure. There are cutbacks everywhere. Improvement is not in sight. The red-green government and its indecisive reform policies are coming to an end. In all probability they will be succeeded by a Christian-Democratic/Liberal government that will press forward along the path in the direction of neoliberalism that was previously only timidly entered into, and continue marching with no heed of losses. In an endeavor to polish the tarnished image of the country and spread a little 'brilliance', politicians¹ from the centre have started to use the heavily loaded term 'cultural nation'. This term is falsely applied today to the state construction of the Federal Republic of Germany², abruptly incorporating all German-language culture and extrapolating a cultural superiority in the present from a glorious past. Unfortunately, the PISA study 2002³ stated that in the same country that prides itself on having produced Goethe and Schiller, Bach and Beethoven, Kant and Hegel, the foundations of this alleged nation of education and culture are vanishing.

The invocation of the 'cultural nation of Germany' is accompanied by the actual nationalisation of cultural policies under the red-green government. The innovations include the introduction of the office of a State Minister of Culture, the *Enquete Commission on Culture in Germany* and the interstate *Federal Culture Foundation*. The reasoning for the introduction of interstate cultural policies was based on diverse tasks pertaining to European integration, for which there is to be one point of contact for the European member states, and with the representation of cultural offers⁴ in a capital city⁵, which the State Senate of Berlin would not be able to establish and maintain by itself. The development

in the direction of an overall state representation provoked criticism from, among others, the minister-presidents of the federal states. Whereas according to the German Constitution they were originally, together with the local authorities, solely responsible for supporting culture, they now feared—justifiably, as it turned out—a loss of competencies and attention. In addition, the situation of competition among the various federal states was (and still is) one of the reasons for the diverse and abundant offers of state-subsidised art and culture in Germany. The establishment of a Berlin 'capital city culture' automatically degraded the federal states to the status of a province. Instead of Munich or Cologne, now the world is invited to look to the 'cultural showcase of the nation' to read the magnitude of the (cultural) nation of Germany.⁶ Although the support structures for art and culture are still primarily the responsibility of the federal states, the partially overlapping national and capital city-oriented additional support measures have resulted in a clear shift of cultural events in the direction of Berlin. Not least of all, the good framework conditions, such as low rents, are a reason for the continuing trend for especially younger artists and all the important galleries to follow the 'promise of Berlin'. A depletion of the 'province', especially in terms of high quality young and experimental art formats, is already noticeable and will certainly increase in the long run.

Within Germany, the 'alliance for film' to strengthen the German film industry, instituted by the first State Minister for Culture Michael Naumann, and a call from Parliament to public and private radio broadcasters to introduce a quota for 'music from Germany' on a voluntary basis, led to debates about a 'monoculture' due to worldwide concentrations of power. What some commentators regarded as a harmlessly sentimental kind of German patriotism, was interpreted by others as a trend to rehabilitate nationalist ideas through a purported 'Leitkultur' (German cultural identity) and warned against the political organisation of cultural resentment. Significantly and with some delay, the art market recognised the potential of the controversial characteristic 'German' and

reacted with the invention of the label ‘Young German Art’ and ‘Young German Painting’, which has meanwhile even been broken down to individual cities. ‘Leipziger Painting’, for instance, sells in the international art market simply because it is from Leipzig. Unlike the export strategy ‘Cool Britannia’ (e.g. ‘Young British Art’), there is no major marketing strategy behind ‘German Art’ on the part of the German creative industries, but only a partial imitation of one.

The best example for the new German cultural awareness that predominates in the Berlin Republic is certainly the exhibition of the F. C. Flick Collection at the Hamburger Bahnhof in Berlin.⁷ The liaison between Berlin cultural policies and a collector seeking to place the name Flick on a positive plane with art is not only questionable from the perspective of museum policies in terms of the contracts concluded, but also illustrates for the first time in the Federal Republic the tendency of national policies to adorn themselves with art, with major art, at least with a large collection—the Flick Collection comprises 2500 works. Zurich turned down the collection and the museum (designed by Rem Koolhaas) that F. C. Flick himself wanted to finance.⁸ In the Berlin Republic, however, the collector was received with open arms by the mayor, the state minister for culture, and the chancellor. F. C. Flick was not only relieved of his political legacy, but also of the costs for his museum.⁹ In addition, the value of the collection is further enhanced and ennobled by the label *National Gallery*. For the collector it is a successful deal in many respects. The scandalisation of the exhibition also had a positive effect on the number of visitors: the first of seven seasons drew 300,000 visitors and is considered a cultural political success. Unlike in Zurich, there was no reaction in Berlin to the loud protests from artists and intellectuals.¹⁰

Another purported success of capital city culture is the recently closed exhibition *MoMa in Berlin*. The *Museum of Modern Art* lent 200 of its pictures—allegedly the most important masterpieces in the world—to Berlin. This exhibition in the Neue Nationalgalerie confirms the currently prevailing insight that the success of culture is largely determined by the

size of its marketing budget. The unusually large advertising campaign moved 1.2 million people to visit the exhibition and raked in a profit of 6 million € for the private event organisers’ limited liability company—despite a lending fee of 4.5 million €. The exhibition was made possible by security collateral from the federal government amounting to 12 million €.

Both of these large-scale projects can be read as examples of cultural policies that enter into questionable private-public partnerships on the basis of a misunderstood liberalisation. These partnerships usually turn out to be of one-sided benefit to the private partners, whose concept of culture is based on quotas and visitor numbers—in other words quantity—as a criterion of success, and which manage to make large sums of money available, despite empty treasuries, for projects that are politically desired. At the same time, it appears acceptable that as a result of this regrouping less ‘useful’ projects and support measures are eliminated. This cultural policy development applies not only to Berlin as the capital, but can also be observed throughout the entire Federal Republic.¹¹ If the lines of development described here are continued without interruption, the consequences of the aforementioned regrouping will be that small, less representative projects or those that cannot be otherwise functionalised will completely vanish from the spectrum of financial support.

The work of the *Bundeskulturstiftung* (Federal Cultural Foundation), instituted in 2002, can be described as counter to the general trend.¹² Its mission is to provide financial support for projects throughout the entire Federal Republic, and the prevailing concept of culture here (still) offers a scope for art and culture that cannot directly be utilised for representative purposes, but is often critical, discursive, processual and experimental. In addition to a thematic programme (e.g. ‘Migration’, ‘Art and City’, ‘Challenge of 11/9’, ‘German Unification’...), there is also support for large-scale and long-term projects, leading institutions, including *Documenta 12*, *Transmediale*, *Berlin Biennale* and the *Days of New Music in Donaueschingen*, for example, as well as for

individual projects. In comparison with its elder sister, the cultural foundation of the federal states, on the one hand, and in comparison with some of the capital city posturing on the other, the *Bundeskulturstiftung* thus proves to have a clearly more progressive profile. With an annual budget of 38 million € in comparison with the cultural foundation of sixteen federal states with a combined total of only 8 million €, the financial resources of the *Bundeskulturstiftung* are auspiciously generous.¹³

Since there has not yet been any clear political reorientation in the Federal Republic in society as a whole, this cannot be maintained for cultural policies either. Germany finds itself in a transitional phase between the humanist tradition and neoliberal economic and utilisation thinking. Culturally conservative, traditional, educated bourgeois politicians operate in parallel and partly in contradiction to the requirements of market-oriented cultural management, which leads to paradoxical scenarios: while the parliamentary enquete commission introduces a call to anchor cultural support in the constitution of the Federal Republic, cultural institutions such as museums are being privatised and exposed to the free play of the market at the same time, and leading CDU politicians from Berlin announce that the days of state cultural support are now over once and for all.¹⁴ It seems as though concrete measures are less guided by intentional political specifications than by the personal preferences of the respective politicians responsible for culture. It is evident how insignificant the role of culture is in the minds of many politicians and how little widespread the idea is of functionalising culture, e.g. for representative or urban development policy purposes, if one looks at current party political election campaigns and city marketing concepts, in which culture is either completely forgotten or treated in just a few banal sentences.¹⁵

A look at the numbers involved in cultural support suggests that Germany can indeed still be called a cultural nation. The cutbacks in the overall budget for culture are no greater than in any other area. It becomes clear, though,

which culture is meant, if we look more closely at the distribution: almost 50% of the cultural budget is taken by theatres and opera; museums and churches (monument preservation) take up a similar proportion of between 15–20% respectively; individual financial support for artists is generally just under 1%. Culture thus means primarily the preservation of cultural heritage. In the contemporary concept of culture, individual artist support and independent artistic production play essentially no role at all.

The number of visual artists in Germany is not only growing, it is undergoing a veritable boom. According to information from the artists social insurance fund (*Künstlersozialkasse—KSK*), the number has doubled in the past ten years. Since the fees paid to the KSK are based on income, these figures represent the following income situation for artists: 1% of the artists have an income of over 100,000 €, 83% indicate an income of under 15,000 €, 20% indicate a negative income, over 50% do not derive their income from artistic work. Income rises up to the age of 45, then it sinks again.¹⁶

An examination of artists' working conditions shows that the *Künstlersozialkasse* itself plays an important role. Through the KSK artists receive basic social insurance. At a yearly income of 15,000 €, the monthly contribution for health and pension insurance amounts to about 115 €. However, since the pension that is later paid out depends on the amount paid into the fund—as is the case with all pension insurance plans—the figures indicate that the average pension of artists insured through the KSK will rarely be above the existence minimum. A discussion about the need for and function of the KSK in parliament in Spring 2005 was accompanied by a flood of protests from people insured with the KSK, who stressed the importance of this insurance and warned politicians against calling the model into question or even wanting to abolish it.

Direct financial support for artists comprises a concise spectrum of scholarships, awards and project subsidies. State

scholarships are awarded at the communal or federal state level (e.g. the working scholarship for visual artists, Hamburg, 12 months, 900 €/month); most of these scholarships have an age limit. In addition there is a large number of private persons, companies and foundations that offer various scholarships. The same is true for prizes and awards. A clear trend here is that well endowed prizes generally go to successful artists with a good income. State subsidies for projects cover means for production, subsidies for catalogues and exhibitions, and travel costs.

All this may create the impression of an abundance of offers, but a constantly growing number (over 20,000!) of visual artists compete for dwindling opportunities. There are also cutbacks even in the 1% area of support for artistic production. Although the cutbacks are minimal in absolute values, they cause a maximum amount of damage in terms of current art production. And as the KSK figures show, the current support and market structures already force a large portion of artists to earn their living with non-independent work or commissions. If subsidies are received, they are temporary or project-related and offer no secured existence. Artistic modes of working that do not follow the classic model of author and work, i.e. collective, interventionist and processual practices, are not covered by this grid of support offers in any case. A work or project results that are suitable for exhibition is often a condition. Project subsidies generally do not include fees for artistic work. With all public support, elaborate bureaucratic procedures for the application—and in the case of approval, also for the settling of accounts—lead to more and more self-administration work for artists.

Despite the symbolic value enhancement of cultural and creative work, the production conditions are deteriorating. In western societies artists tend to organise individually, i.e. without forming special interest groups, which is due to their idea of working autonomously and self-determined. Cultural producers are only gradually beginning to purposely discuss their understanding of their role and to establish relationships between independent creative work and

the cultural economy defined by politics and commerce.¹⁷ Organising politically and working together with other political movements that fight neoliberalism and offer resistance also means leaving behind the sheltered space of 'art' and the conventions associated with it.

No one other than the cultural producers themselves will have to question the role that what they do plays or should play in society, for whom and in whose interest they work and who should pay for it. The market is happy to take in anything that is either complacent or seeks to accommodate the notion of the romantic bourgeois artist image. An outstanding example of this reactionary tendency is the success of the artist Jonathan Meese.¹⁸ What is treated in the major and important exhibitions is determined by a few galleries operating worldwide. The social consensus to afford the luxury of artists doing things that are only accessible to a small minority is about to be lost due to the influx of models of economic thinking and acting, and formerly pluralist art production is reduced to what can be—for whatever reason—functionalised.

What remains are self-organised microsystems, in which artists learn to develop their own political agency and the power of independent judgment. Examples for these kinds of 'places' include the bookshop and publishing company *b-books*¹⁹ in Berlin with regular discussion events, *The Thing Frankfurt*²⁰, a complex network of website, blog, mailing list, gallery, and events dealing with local cultural policies in Frankfurt as well as art theory, the mailing list [echo] for art, *criticism and cultural policies in Hamburg*²¹, with which several hundred cultural producers have created a platform that is both digital and local for information exchange and discussion, and the art magazine *starship*²², successfully published by a collective since 1998. The point is to expand the ability to (passively) read with the ability to (actively) write, which is characteristic of 'small media'.²³

In a not too distant future, the Federal Republic of Germany will have abandoned itself completely to neoliberalism. It will have left its humanist tradition behind,

but will still praise itself as a 'cultural nation' because of a few German pop stars in the art market. At least half of all the museums, theatres and operas will no longer exist. And those that are left will be far removed from being able to be used as 'resource centres for transversal communicational practices', but will instead bear a stronger resemblance to leisure centres and theme parks, whose mission is to entertain large segments of the population.²⁴ Art is everything that is creative and can be sold. The art business is controlled by a network of economically effective cultural managers. Art magazines exclusively serve to promote sales. And there will still always be artists. Forced to earn their living in a precarised world of work, their situation as cultural producers has further deteriorated. As 'professionals of the nation', they have proved insufficient. Nevertheless, they cannot stop fulfilling their self-imposed tasks of fighting over the meaning of art and working on improving the structures.

1. Cf. the article 'Das hat Humboldt nie gewollt' by the former state minister for culture Nida-Rümelin in *Die Zeit*, No. 10, 2005.
2. 'Cultural nation' is a term from the 18th century used, in its literal sense, for a people not living in a common state, but with a sense of connection due to genealogy, language, culture and history.
3. The PISA study was a comparative survey of the significant competencies of 15-year-old adolescents in different countries in the three areas of reading competency, mathematics and natural sciences. In comparison with other countries, Germany is far below the OECD average in this survey. The proportion of weak and weakest readers is unusually high at 20%. The results set off a shock in Germany.
4. The Capital City Cultural Fund provides subsidies amounting to an annual budget of 10.2 million for Berlin as the federal capital to support significant single measures and events.

5. The city of Berlin is both a federal state and the capital city of the Federal Republic of Germany. Following reunification, the German Parliament decided in 1991 to replace Bonn as the Federal Capital. Since 1999 Berlin has assumed the function of the seat of the German parliament and the government.
6. This expression is from the State Minister for Culture Michael Naumann.
7. The Flick Collection is a collection of contemporary art. The name comes from F. C. Flick, grandson of Friedrich Flick, who was found guilty of war crimes in the Nuremberg Trials. The capital used to build up the collection came from war profits and the brutal exploitation of forced labor. The heir F. C. Flick refuses to take responsibility for the history of his family and his fortune, and has to this day not made any payments to the fund to provide restitution to the—still living—forced laborers in the Flick Company in the Third Reich.
8. The collector abandoned his plan to provide a home for his collection in Zurich following vehement protests by artists and intellectuals.

9. Over seven years, exhibiting the F. C. Flick Collection will cost the city about 6 million €—to be financed from the running budget by 'rearranging priorities'.
10. One of the protest actions against the Flick Collection (<http://www.flickconnection.de/>).
11. For example, the Tamm Museum Hamburg: the city invested 30 million € in a museum for a maritime private collection and guaranteed the collector an autocratic position by contract.
12. (<http://www.bundeskulturstiftung.de/>).
13. Another individual project that should be mentioned, although it is not necessarily typical since it also has a representative character, is *signandsight* (<http://www.signandsight.com/>), the English-language edition of the online magazine *Perlentaucher*, which provides daily summaries of the themes and theses of culture supplements from German-language newspapers. With 1.4 million € start-up financing, public funding supports German cultural journalism, which has thus itself become a cultural project and is intended to serve German self-presentation to the rest of the world.
14. 'The State protects and supports culture' is the intended new Article 20b.
15. Hamburg Marketing AG, *Die Stadt als Marke, Hamburg Wachsende Stadt*
16. The *Künstlersozialkasse* (KSK—artists social insurance fund) was created in 1983 and offers social insurance in the form of health insurance and pension insurance for freelance artists and journalists, similar to an employment situation. Up to 50% of the costs for the insurance is covered by the KSK. These subsidies are financed with allocated funds from the Federal Government (20%) and with artists' social insurance contribution (30%). These social insurance contributions must be paid to the KSK by all enterprises that regularly commission freelance artists and journalists (museums, galleries, etc.).
17. (<http://www.ateliereuropa.com/>).
18. He originally became well known with multi-part trash panoramas and installations arising from his manically innocent creative fury, but he meanwhile supplies the art market with decorative oil paintings and the concomitant genius myth.
19. (<http://www.bbooks.de>).
20. (<http://www.thing-frankfurt.de>).
21. (<http://soundwarez.org/pipermail/echo/>).
22. (<http://www.starship-magazine.org>).
23. *Netzkulturen*, Inke Arns, Hamburg 2002.
24. Brian Holmes, 'The Spaces of a Cultural Question', 2004 (http://www.republicart.net/disc/precariat/holmes-osten01_en.htm).

THE ISSUE OF 'OTHERNESS' HAS BECOME A CLICHÉ, BUT THE PROBLEM STILL EXISTS

An e-mail-interview with Hüseyn Bahri Alptekin

Questions: Raimund Minichbauer

I would like to start with state cultural policy. What will be the main developments (in general and especially concerning the field of contemporary visual arts) in Turkey on national and regional levels until 2015? And how will it deal with regional disparities within Turkey itself?

I think we have to skip anything about the state's cultural policy in Turkey. We have never had one and we won't ever have one either, which benefits contemporary arts, especially the visual arts. This is due to the monopolist state tradition and the government's power strategies, and by the same token this extends to dealing with regional disparities within Turkey itself as well. The state works with the artists it thinks are appropriate representatives of the country—artists who work with conventional strategies, coming from modernistic tradition, academics, state oriented sculpturers and painters who produce "beautiful art, modern art"—and that is the beginning and the end of it.

However, the state has supported some bilateral international projects. But the state doesn't even support the Istanbul or Ankara art scene, never mind the other regions. Some of the artists close to the state's policies and to the government in power have always been supported, but that is another 'ontology' and we are not talking about macramé, right?

What is the situation concerning the influence of private and corporate sponsors on the arts scene today, and what could be future developments?

The actual situation concerning the influence of private and corporate sponsors on the arts scene is improving somewhat, but it is still fairly minimalist in terms of full support. The support they offer is always conditional. The support is quite subjective, arbitrary, capricious as well as pragmatic and

random. It can be offered but also it can be abandoned, withdrawn without any specific reason, and there is no sponsor policy or ethics.

We never know what future developments there might be. If there is an economic crisis this in turn causes a cultural crisis, a cultural crisis causes social crisis and paranoia, and in that case we have to forget about art. Hostility towards art then emerges (then art becomes the symptom of the loss, they are reluctant to support it when there is economic crisis). The media have always supported art in terms of sponsor priorities and their own local interests rather than addressing global issues. Even globalism is structured in the sense that we are a closed, introverted and basically feudal culture. The rich support the rich, the poor are pragmatic...

Although private and corporate sponsors have been slow in this regard, they are gradually becoming aware of the global, international and ideological paradigm of contemporary art and its role and how this is linked to cultural policies, European Union Policies. They are aware of the emerging power of art within the media as a tool of communication. It is a paradoxical but a hopeful sign for the future. On the other hand, global capitalism tends to appropriate sub-cultures, pop-cultures and other marginal aspects of urban life that contemporary art best represents, engages with and participates in. In that sense, sponsorship is both intelligent and opportunist. I believe there will be more support for art in the future. It is in their interest.

Turkey's position in the international arts world has been shaped by institutions like the Istanbul Biennial. How do you imagine that this position will develop within the next decade?

It is quite true that Turkey's position in the international art scene has been shaped by Istanbul Biennial as the major institution. The peak was the '92 Biennial. The Biennial has been structured in such a way that it has attracted international interest in Istanbul and even to other regions such as the Balkans, Russia, South-east Europe, etc.

for the first time. The Biennials that followed '92 with the introduction of foreign curators and with the involvement of the international professional art crowd has played a big role and so step by step Istanbul has attracted more and more international attention with its exotic ambiance and its emerging artists. I believe that the Istanbul Biennial, whatever its structure is, will become one of the important institutions with a traditional international perspective just like the Film, Music, Jazz and Theater Festivals—all organized by IKSIV (Istanbul Art and Culture Foundation), a private foundation supported by public funding and sponsorship. What is a traditional international perspective in this context? Up to now, i.e. during the last 10 years, there have been a lot more music and film festivals apart from those organized by the Istanbul Art and Culture Foundation. There will be more contemporary art events in the next decade. In the last five years Project 4L and the Platform Contemporary Art Centre have become important institutions in the contemporary visual arts scene. The latter is the only institution in Istanbul internationally recognised as an art centre, archive and international residency. Meanwhile, since 2000 there have also been a few artists running collective projects, marginal networks and non-governmental art organisations, that worked without any financial support, just individual initiative and solidarity, collecting rent from friends and so on. Some have collapsed due to the lack of financial support, some have lost motivation and energy, some have given up the struggle and shifted to incorporate themselves within more powerful and glamorous networks. After all, the international atmosphere and ambiance of the Biennial has stimulated alternative structures, events, artist alliances and publications in general. Unfortunately the Sea Elephant Travel Agency, an artists' collective known locally as 'loft', which I initiated in 2000, has also ended and ceased regular activities in 2004 due to financial problems and local difficulties. The project continues with some international collaborative projects.

What are the developments and experiences with co-operation between the European Union and Turkey in the field of cultural policy and funding programmes? What will happen in the future?

Co-operation between the European Union and Turkey in the field of cultural policy and funding programmes have developed quite rapidly in the last couple of years with residency programmes, international exhibitions, symposia and conferences. There is a great deal of action in the contemporary art scene in Istanbul and even in the provinces of Turkey, especially in Diyarbakir and Izmir. To comment on that miraculously rapid acceleration is complex in many different senses. Probably there are similarities and a kind of *raison d'être* within the Balkan region. Mainly it goes along with the ideological and political strategies of the European cultural policy decision-makers. They choose different regions at different times, such as first the Balkans, then Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, the Caucasian region (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, even Chechnya), and Turkey as a candidate country and the geographical region where Kurdish people live, especially Diyarbakir and the region around it. Actually for the last ten years an abstract geographical area called the South-East European region has been invented, but frankly no high-level projects have been realised. The decision to invent this region is not only based on economic, geographical and political concerns but is also due to a need for 'otherness' in relation to Europe. Thus the need for the exotic, folkloric, ethnic, marginal, peripheral frames cultural policies too. The issue of the 'other' and 'otherness' has been discussed for the last fifteen years and become a cliché, but the problem still exists. Some institutions have strategically manipulated some interesting projects proposed by artists of the region, because they benefit their administrative needs to spend their budgets instead of realising projects that would develop the dynamics of the art in the region. Of course the mobility of the artists and intellectuals of the region provided within the framework is extremely important,

unless it results in the repetitive circulation of the same people through the art circuit, in a kind of symposia tourism. You are invited to attend the discussions, to have some fun, but it hardly ever turns into the possibility of strong individual expression. Instead it results merely in useless workshops and endless repetitive group shows. The symposia and forums usually end without any post-production or evidence of future activity. The same organisations repeat exactly the same meetings in exactly the same places. Networks are announced and proposed but remain inaccessible due to their administrative and bureaucratic structures and jargon. This approach does not really stimulate artists to realise their creative projects. Basically, their ideas and creative proposals remain suspended in the air and are sometimes used by the administration to meet other financial interests.

My experience of attending such forums has sometimes ended up with my feeling great frustration and even depression. One of my projects with the Sea Elephant Travel Agency co-operative, entitled *Jules Verne and the Black Sea*, was presented on several occasions in various symposia and forums, but in the end was appropriated without permission, manipulated and actually taken away from me so that it could be used to apply for European Union funding.¹ It was selected and given a huge budget. I have been reduced to being an observer of my own project that has become removed from the original idea, now involves different partners and has been given a different focus, simply to spend the money on worthless events. Unfortunately, that happened three years ago and it still continues. All our efforts with our regional partners, together with five years investment of energy and vision, have been for nothing. I know that there is no copyright on ideas, and in any event a long process of legal intervention will kill an artist's motivation. It has all taken a lot of energy and has unfortunately disrupted what had been a potentially fruitful project.

This is just an extreme personal experience, and some other more positive programmes have co-operated with other artists and events. But it all goes through more and more

institutionalised frameworks. Unfortunately, artist initiatives and collectives can't maintain their continuity and motivation. They are basically conceived as marginal, since they do not fit within the bilateral framework. Many individual initiatives just fade away.

I am quite optimistic about future developments. First of all there are a lot of artists from abroad in residencies in Istanbul. There are many European institutions and curators visiting the city, living here for long periods, working here and realising various collaborative projects with local artists. They have the opportunity to investigate various local dynamics, alternative structures and gain knowledge of the contemporary art scene, its history and context. Residency programmes in both directions are extremely important, especially the artists visiting from abroad. They live here and in the regions, and when they go back they can say more about the situation here.

For the future development there are different dynamics that are already advancing quite rapidly. A lot of young artists have the chance to show abroad and they have vast possibilities for mobility as artists through residencies and projects. Networks and communication are easily accessible to everybody by means of Internet. There are a lot of artists now who live in Istanbul, and they also promote different aspects of the local artist scene and vision. Since Turkey is a candidate for the European Union, this also provides a great transparency and interaction for the local artists here. Unfortunately, some non-governmental initiatives remain on a low-profile level. Strangely most of these attempts focus on the search for funding to address local social issues and conflicts rather than for ambitious and visionary artistic projects.

Academics also have a tendency to use their status and power in an elitist manner. Universities should be unconditional for artists in a *Derridian* sense. The academy requires local stability rather than mobility and international exchanges.

For the future, the best way forward is to have a European presence here on the ground in Turkey rather than through an abstract conceptual and intellectual ready-made approach.

Which new counter-strategies are being developed in the cultural field that could serve as future models concerning new forms of self-organisation and transnational co-operation; new strategies by feminist, anti-racist, Kurdish, etc. groups, finding new ways to counteract logics of permanent co-optation of critique through capitalism?

These counter-strategies tend to be ephemeral and do not last. They are generally opportunist attempts to seek a way out and possibilities to escape. Complaints of discrimination are known to be sympathetically received by the outside world, including Europe. Political, ideological and ethnic issues are more successful gateways than the work itself. That discordant context results in a strange trap for artists. They are expected to be or to produce art that is feminist, anti-racist, Kurdish, etc. Maybe they will end up in certain global contemporary networks and gain mobility and participate in a lot of group exhibitions, but it is within a certain context that is dictated to them. That is the essential risk of this trap. However, this 'otherness' is a category shared by both artists and those who commission and fund the art. There are nonetheless some productions that have integrity. Different ontologies do exist, and there are now more possibilities to communicate as there are a lot more networks and cultural platforms.

How will the overall situation concerning public funding in the field of contemporary visual arts develop?

The structure of funding and supporting the projects is hierarchical. One side is applying, the other is offering; one is proposing, the other is answering; one is asking, the other is compromising; one is wishing, the other is negotiating. One

is supposed to be such and such and therefore the applicant claims that he/she is such and such... One's position is controlled and he/she answers to that. One is supposed to be 'the other'...

That paradigm should be changed in favour of a critical perspective, which requires a dialogue on positioning and a discussion of the situation. As art is another kind of knowledge, the dialogue within cultures and cultural policies should be firstly based on 'sameness', rather than 'otherness'. This will avoid notions of a hierarchical function that leads to ignorance and conflict. Any art event deals with specific knowledge and the way to reach that knowledge is very important. It is critical and political, it is an act and that is also part of the knowledge. Therefore all the perspectives (curatorial, financial, creative, post-productive, etc.) that construct the work and knowledge require a vital dialogue. Otherwise hospitality turns easily and suddenly into hostility and we miss the knowledge where art resides.

An actual event can be an appropriate example in this instance. A group exhibition opened on 8th July 2005 in Berlin, at the Martin Gropius Bau, called *Urban Realities: Focus Istanbul*. This exhibition claims to cover the faces and perspectives of a city and culture which is a candidate for membership in the European Union and to valorise the strong emerging contemporary art scene and its components. The show consists of 40 artists from Istanbul and 40 artists from abroad. Most of them have mainly worked in Istanbul or on Istanbul, and some of the non-Istanbul artists who were commissioned to produce work had not been in Istanbul before. Curators and organisers have claimed that this is not one of these 'national' or 'regional' exhibitions such as a Turkish, Istanbul or Balkan show.

Up to that point all was fine. In the middle of the process of realising the project, some artists had some problems with the structure, conceptual framework and curatorial and financial aspects of the project. A flux of e-mailing started among the artists and the curators, leading to a series of meetings in Istanbul organised among some of those

participating artists from Istanbul. Through that process of communication or mis-communication, some artists have withdrawn from the project as well as some Istanbul curators and a writer.

Unfortunately, the project coordinators, curators and organisers took this situation as a boycott and didn't seek a dialogue to understand the motives for what happened. The reasons were not taken seriously and were viewed as a form of cultural rebellion. In fact no collective decision was taken, it was more of a collective reflex. The withdrawing artists had different individual reasons for not participating in the project, conceptual, cultural, ideological, ethical, curatorial and financial reasons. The participating artists were not considered as individual decision makers with individual artistic personae, but were seen as part of a cultural boycott. None of them have received a personal e-mail but only general ones addressed to all or the same letter with the address and name changed.

That was not really a collective act and it could happen to other similar projects with the same problems of a risky and slippery focus and a discriminatory structure. Unfortunately, this exploded the project. What was intended as a friendly project, a hospitality for Istanbul, its culture and its artists, turned into a situation of cultural hostility, all because of the missing dialogue between two cultures and a hierarchical cultural policy. A show is just a show. A show is not just a show.

1. The *Jules Verne and the Black Sea* project is based on the 'Mutual Realities, Artistic Exchanges, Inter-Regional Solidarity' idea, a boat-lab tracing an imaginary itinerary of Jules Verne in the Black Sea belt (including Moldova and the Caucasian regions) after his novel *Kérebán le Tétu* (*Keraban the Stubborn* in English). The project was borrowed without permission by Appollonia (South-East Cultural Exchanges), based in Strasbourg, France, and an application made to Culture 2000. Once the project was selected for support it was totally changed.

Ideologies to be Constantly Challenged

Tone Hansen

The year 2005 may turn out to be a crucial turning point for the development of the Norwegian and Nordic art scenes towards 2015. Not only is Norway currently celebrating its statehood centenary, which the political right wing has criticised from the start for containing too much national self-criticism and too little fun and festivities. During the three last years, several white papers and strategy plans on the function and development of the art scene have been released and implemented. The contours of a very different art policy (and social policy) are emerging on the horizon with *White paper no. 48, 'Culture Policy Towards 2014'* and the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Strategy for Norwegian Collaboration with Southern Countries on Cultural and Sports Issues* leading the way: systematic privatisation of the remnants from social democracy, while Norway is propagated internationally as an environmentally responsible and peace campaigning nation with culture as an important ingredient.¹ No mention is made of the fact that Norway assisted the American war in Afghanistan with Special Forces and is investing its oil revenue in environmentally damaging fish farms in Chile. From 2003, Norway has had a vision of being one of the most innovative countries in Europe. The consequences for 2015 might be as follows:

- More State subsidies than ever are invested in art. The funds are employed to a greater degree through means such as Forum for Culture and Business, and as projects that are directly politically initiated and temporary, such as through foreign aid to countries in the southern hemisphere. Indirectly, the state supports commercial companies through support for cultural exchange connected to larger development projects in the Third World, and through the inter-Nordic collaboration Nordic Creative Alliances, a business-based cultural exchange forum. The differences between commercial and ideal foundations are blurred.

- The arm's length principle has become a two-edged problem for institutions and artists, because paradoxically independence is offered in return for obeying orders. Rather

than letting go of its institutions, the State is more determined in its instrumental use of them.

In accordance with major changes in the order of priorities for the State and efficiency improvement measures in the public sector, the culture sector must also put up with management by objective. Management by objective has become a natural thing: the State gives support, and expects social effects in return. The result is a fundamental polarization of the art field. A growing political interest follows as a need to protect the art institution against a growing bureaucracy, as there is no choice not to become politically engaged.

- Funding systems are run to a greater extent randomly and on a political/administrative basis, on account of a weakened Nordic identity and a deteriorating system of exchange in the art field in the Nordic countries following the closure of the Nordic Institute for Contemporary Art (NIFCA) in 2006 by the Nordic Council of Ministers. The large national institutions swallow up more of the inter-Nordic subsidies because they are identifiable entities in the political system.

- As national institutions are merged into larger units and partly privatized into foundations, they compete with smaller organizations and artists from art collectives for available funds.

- Outsourcing projects and the wide use of external curators in the national art institutions widens the gap between the artist and the institution. As the roles are blurred, the responsibility for financing and paying artists is fragmented. The exhibition fee, a fee all state supported institutions are obliged to pay artists, which was won in the seventies by the Artists Union, is more often disregarded, because the institutions do not consider themselves responsible actors but mere facilitators. As a consequence, the identities of the museums/galleries are also indistinct.

- Cultural conflicts that used to be debated to a certain extent in the public sphere are hidden away in interdisciplinary committees, and consequently lack discussion in wider perspectives.

- The conditions of artists who refuse to become part of the entertainment economy are deteriorating, because funding for independent projects has decreased. This makes it more difficult for free groups and artists to survive in one of the most expensive countries in the world. But the role of the artists has become even more interesting than the products both for the business world and for cultural policies, as networking on a personal level is the new strategy for official cultural policy internationally. This could open up new possibilities, as well as dangers.

- Norway is still not part of the European Union. But it is a member of Schengen.²

A Growing Bureaucracy

Independent art institutions that were previously in close contact with the political bureaucracy have been turned into private foundations with boards of directors appointed by the Ministry, and merged into larger units according to geographical location rather than by discipline. The ideal for the selection of board members is disinterestedness. Art professionals (artists, art historians, critics) are therefore excluded from the boards of directors, while the places are occupied by representatives from other ministries, business representatives and professional board members.³ On the other hand, this does not give cultural workers entry to the board of Statoil, for instance, or the state owned real estate company Entra.

In several articles, Knut Olav Åmås, editor of the periodical *Samtiden*, has pointed out how persons who are loyal to the Ministry are awarded central positions. In the commentary 'The New Power Structures in Cultural Norway' he calls attention to how today's cultural policy is formed by an administration which is constantly becoming stronger.⁴ Åmås stresses that restructuring and mergers are important ministerial instruments when funds are sparse. This increases the need for investigation into the shifts of power in the cultural sector. Rather than seeing the problem with concentration of power, the Ministries are actively cultivating it.

Examples of this relative disengagement from the State can be found in two different Norwegian institutions: The National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design (NFK) and the Oslo National Academy of the Arts (KHiO). The National Museum was created as a private foundation in 2001 by merging five separate art museums and institutions.⁵ While still financed by the State, a board of directors manages it with the businessman Christian Bjelland as chairman of the board. The KHiO, which now offers education in theatre, opera, ballet, visual arts, design and fine arts, has gone from having a separate management for each discipline to a system of a top management, headed by a Ministry-appointed principal. In both cases the Ministry appoints the boards of directors. This means that the boards are increasingly making the decisions that were previously taken by the Ministry in collaboration with the different artistic disciplines. Thus, the decision-makers have come closer to the institutions, while the influence of the artistic disciplines has been reduced because they no longer have representatives on the boards. Examples such as these bear witness to the fragmenting of the status of the disciplines against an omnipotent administration. They also tell the tale of growing proletarianization among professional employees, who are increasingly subject to suspicion in the systems. The art institutions' widespread use of the head-hunting company Ørjasæther for recruiting professional employees has led to a de-democratization of processes which were previously open to discussion prior to decisions being made. In Norway, foundations, whether they are state supported or not, are exempted from the 'Law of Publicity' (offentlighetsloven), a law that applies to all State administrations.⁷ Institutions like NMK can therefore decide which case documents to make public or not. Institutions create an attractive facade towards a larger group of the public, while transparency is lacking in fundamental areas.

In Norway, there has been no tradition for educational institutions in the art field to define themselves clearly in terms of political or radical views. An idea of radicalism of sorts has

rather been taken for granted as a part of art's inherent critical stance. Therefore, art education is also especially vulnerable to the new policies. The relative disengagement from the State, which the KHiO merger actually causes, could have been used to force the educational institution to become more self-critical and subject-oriented, as well as openly involved in the changes within society at large. Instead of thinking of art practise as investigations and research and creating studies like Critical Studies in Malmö, for instance, the opposite is happening, as the KHiO has started a collaboration with the private business academy BI to educate our future leaders.

From Cultural Life to Cultural Business —A Disciplining Project

White paper no. 48, 'Culture Policy Towards 2014' was presented by the Bondevik administration (consisting of the Conservative party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democrats who hold the prime minister post) in 2003. By and large, the report acts as an inventory of everything Norway has to offer in terms of arts and culture and more or less affiliated industries such as tourism, food, agriculture and museums, with emphasis on the film and music industries and certain subsidy schemes. The sociologist Dag Solhjel describes the change of course in this way: 'The white paper is without self-reflection when it comes to possible negative consequences of increased national central administration in the arts and culture policies. The democratizing, decentralizing, popular and culturally open aspects of the celebrated first white papers on culture in the seventies seem to have disappeared completely'.⁸

Even though the white paper contains no proposals, it gives a direction to future cultural politics. Amongst others, a clearer political control of the Arts Council and a simplification of the state grants system into more interdisciplinary committees. A development like this will make it more difficult for artists groups and individual artists to gain support for projects outside of the politically prioritized fields. It also threatens smaller institutions possibility to counteract as

critical counter public spheres, as they are totally dependent on support to survive on a professional level.

Based on this white paper, Parliament voted to request a white paper on the relation between art, culture and business. *White paper no. 22, 'Culture and Business'* was published in March 2005. It sets out to give a thorough perspective on the relation between culture, business and society, where the objective is to give the cultural sector a larger role in something called a future-oriented innovation system. Because it has a scope as wide as its predecessor had, and because it lacks any concrete suggestions for action, it says very little. It must be read for what it doesn't say and what it actually does: it redefines cultural life as cultural business.

In the white paper, the cultural businesses are defined as follows: "businesses which manufacture products where the communicative aspects are primary. The choice of business as concept is made in correlation with the focus on cultural production in a business perspective, and partly because the study primarily addresses private enterprises selling cultural products as commodities in a private market".⁸

I suspect that the report has a completely different function. In my eyes, it is an instrument for giving art institutions guidance on how to adapt to the roadmap of the future that the white paper draws up: a cultural Norway that creates new jobs and incites growth in businesses and national identity. The underlying message: in the future, the State will not fully finance cultural initiatives, and it will award initiatives which partly finance their projects with private funding. *White Paper no. 22* is first and foremost a disciplining document.

The white paper encourages business and art to meet already in the course of art education, and it hints that especially artists in the fine arts are antipathetic to private capital, but that fortunately this is changing.

The private business academy BI has started an educational program in Cultural Management, and in 2004, the KHiO entered in a collaboration to expand the education into a joint Masters degree in Cultural Management. The

collaboration is made public in the autumn of 2005 with a seminar entitled Art + Capital. Crossover Expertise.

The seminar is held on the premises of the KHiO, and a sky-high participation fee (490 Euro for a one-day seminar) keeps all possibly interested artists and art students at an arm's length from lectures like 'Education for a New Market'. Thus a situation which could lead to conflict and debate is avoided, but actual exchange is also avoided. This illustrates the private interest in art specifically as something private. Seeing art as a common space for reflection is less in the interests of the business world. The experience of art is regarded an exclusive privilege rather than a right. It is clear that if an art practice wants to be involved in society, it has to relate to and in some ways participate in the existing power systems and the exchanges. Meetings like the one described here might function as an opening to further studies of the rhetoric and mechanics of commercial markets, for instance, and critical artist praxis might influence some microstructures by asking the difficult questions. The question then is how and who can create these meeting points, and how can it best be done? Until now the commercial market and the art life have had a mutual advantage of a certain distance, and a further distinction is needed in order to create a challenging rather than an affirmative exchange. On the web pages of the Forum for Culture and Business as well as in state reports, it is obvious that the artist in persona has increasingly become more interesting than her products, and it is clear that artists are regarded as a means of communication in the purpose of the good. Lectures like the aforementioned mimic what the business world wants to hear. Or is it just what we think they want? Through the nineties, Norway has conducted several experiments and pilot projects to test collaboration between culture and business.⁹ Forum for Culture and Business was established in 2001, inspired by Arts and Business in Great Britain. The forum is funded by the State. Equivalents of the Forum are established in Denmark and Sweden.¹⁰ Together these three organizations form a joint Nordic partnership under the umbrella Nordic Creative Alliances, founded in 2004

and economically supported by the Nordic Innovation Centre, which is again under the auspices of the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers. A further development of the collaboration is expected.

Exit NIFCA

Roughly at the same time as the consolidation of a Nordic culture-business partnership, a study on Nordic cultural collaboration was published, which was written by the Finnish director Ann Sandelin and commissioned by the Ministers of Culture in the Nordic Council of Ministers (MR-K).¹¹ The verdict is ruthless: the cultural collaboration is described as bureaucratic and badly marketed, with little political symbolical effect. The solution is to shut down the Nordic Institute for Contemporary Art (NIFCA) and its sister organizations, and transfer its funds to agencies which are directly under the jurisdiction of the Nordic Council of Ministers. The report from the work group appointed by MR-K in the aftermath of Sandelin's study is phrased in milder modes of expression, but the consequences are the same. The report states that: 'The current sector-based structure will partly be replaced by temporary programs. Programs will have a theme, an objective, a budget and a time frame to be determined by MR-K. To assist administration and idea generation, MR-K may appoint special expert groups that are to function as arm's length organs for the programs (the control organs). The groups are always appointed for a limited period of time'.¹²

Based on the Sandelin study, the essayist Siri Elisabeth Siger draws a parallel to the situation prior to the establishment of the Office for Contemporary Art (OCA) in Norway in 2001: 'This looks very much like the former structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a changing advisory expert committee lacking any form of decision-making authority. The artists experienced this as having poor information flow, discontinuity and strong confusion as to whom to consult, deadlines for applications, etc. Furthermore the structure was strongly characterized by diplomatic ways

of thinking and organizing. By moving the responsibility out of the Ministry and into the professional community, much of the problem was solved'.¹³

The question about the Nordic cultural collaboration is this: In whose interest will it work? The Danish organization Young Art Workers (UKK) was one of the first to protest.¹⁴ In response to the official report, a faction including representatives from the different Arts Councils in the Nordic collaboration and trade unions in Denmark wrote the report 'A New Structure for the Nordic Cultural Collaboration'. The report aims to comply with 'the principal requirements in the MR-K's proposition for a new structure', while at the same time attempting to preserve the autonomy of the Councils of the individual artistic disciplines and provide them with a degree of independence. The alternative proposition also speaks out for the importance of gathering knowledge. A Nordic Art Council maintains interdisciplinary functions with representatives from all respective organs, whereas decisions affecting the various disciplines are made by the organs of the disciplines, which may keep familiar names such as NIFCA.

Power and the distribution of funds are encouraged to be viewed as a conference table rather than as pyramidal hierarchies (according to Åsa Sonjasdotter), and while a hierarchy will exist for outward purposes, decisions will be made after collective negotiation and discussion of a project. The actions and positions of the institutions are not left to be decided solely by individuals, but the different disciplines have enough freedom at their disposal to be able to make their own decisions with qualitative justification. The alternative suggestion is a diplomatic document.

Alternate Paths:

The question is who will define the open space of art and how the autonomy of the art institution can be defended while defending an open and radical art practice that connects to communities outside the art space. In many ways the art space can be a common meeting point, a centre for activities where several interest groups are involved. New parallels and

new definitions which cannot be confused with a business-based or bureaucratic concept of art must be developed. This is both a linguistic and an organizational question. Should collectives be formed to a greater degree outside the traditional systems, or conquer the existing structures? In Norway the establishment of the Office for Contemporary Art (OCA) in 2001 has warded off growing nationalism, and at the same time it provides an opening for international artistic practice. Institutions working without a gallery space play an important role in inviting artists and researchers interested in investigating certain structures, phenomena or collections in the specific regions. Rather than just facilitating studios, they can have a significant role in creating research laboratories (to use a worn out metaphor), or function as small universities. The white papers should be further examined to find ways of using them. One strategy might be to see them as useful tools opening up possibilities different from their intentions. A conformist Norway is waking up to a dawning political consciousness, but as all parties, including the Socialist Party (SV) and with exception of the Progress Party, are gathering in the centre of politics, turning to politicians might be futile.¹⁵ Political work has traditionally been carried out by powerful trade unions. Trade unions have the power and capital to start alternate studies conducted by diverse groups of society to provide a more realistic picture of the art field and the economic situation of the artists, in order to create a common base of references for further goals to be set. Personally I would like to see that happen, but only as report coming from the field itself, conducted by research artists. The question is whether traditional unions can act quickly enough and whether they are capable of building long-lasting strategies, or whether new alliances and pressure groups must be built. If the latter is the case, knowledge-producing collectives working across national borders is the way to go. The conflict between self-organized strategies and taking over institutions needs further discussions. In Denmark and in Sweden the formation of the UKK and the IKK unites professional art workers independent of status and aims to work for the art

world and not merely the artists' rights.¹⁶ Students at KHiO are arranging counter-conferences, and they are currently starting a new student union with regulations based on those of the Danish UKK and the Norwegian UKS, to prevent their struggle for values from disappearing when the next class of students takes over.^{17 & 18} Their project functions as a parallel situation securing information for the students.

Translated by Børge Lund,
edited by Aileen Derieg

Åsa Sonjasdotter, head of the board of
directors, NIFCA.

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Conversations with:
Stian Grøgaard, philosopher.

1. *White paper no. 48, 'Culture Policy Towards 2014 and Strategy for Norwegian Collaboration with Southern Countries on Cultural and Sports Issues'*. The latter is a strategy document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presented by the Minister of International Development, Hilde Frafjord Johnson from the Christian Democrats.

'It is thought-provoking that the first general strategy for international cultural collaboration is presented by the Minister of International Development. And not by the Minister of Foreign Affairs', culture editor Per Anders Madsen in *Aftenposten* stated in August this year. There is no such strategy plan for collaboration with countries which are Norway's economical peers. It is nonetheless important to have an idea of cultural exchange beyond the development aid budget.

2. All new European Laws are implemented, as Norway is member of the European Free Trade Association—EFTA and The European Economic Area—EEA.

3. The extreme right wing Progress Party has succeeded in getting the culture-hostile former editor in chief of the gossip magazine *Se og Hør*, Knut Haavik, elected as board member of the Arts Council Norway. It is no exaggeration to assert that appointments of persons to positions in institutions, to whom they are basically hostile, can only happen in cultural institutions. Haavik uses his position to publicly attack artists' ability to make a decent income and accuses them of being lazy in general.

4. *Aftenposten*, June 26 2005.

5. The National Museum consists of the former National Gallery, Museum for Contemporary Art, Museum for Arts and Crafts, the Architecture Museum and the Touring Exhibition Norway. Other institutions might be merged later on.
6. Lov om offentlighet i forvaltningen av 19. juni 1970 nr. 69 (The Law on Publicity in the Administration of June 19 1970 nr 69). The law secures the public right to insight into case documents, and it encourages.
7. Dag Solhjel, "Sterkere styring over kulturlivet" ("Stronger Government Over Cultural Life"). *Kunstskritikk*. no 5 September 2003.
8. *Stortingsmelding* nr. 22, Kultur og næring, 2004.
9. Kultex from 1996 was to sell cultural products directed by the Norwegian Export Council. In 2001 the report *Samspill mellom kulturliv og næringsliv. Tango for to (Interplay Between Culture and Business. A Tango for Two)* was published to increase the interaction between culture and business and incite creativity and growth. *Innovasjon Norge (Innovation Norway)* was allocated 5 million Norwegian kroner earmarked for culturally based commercial development.
10. *Kultur och Näringsliv (Forum for Culture and Business)* in Sweden was founded in 1988. The members are around 200 businesses, business organizations and cultural organizations, and membership fees finance it. An important goal is to increase tax deductions for businesses with cultural engagements. Their annual meeting in 2005 was held in the National Museum in Stockholm, and they have many of their meetings and awards in museums and galleries, but then most of them are members anyway. *Nyx forum for kultur og erhverv in Denmark* was established in 2002. Taking its name from Greek mythology, it is the one which has gone furthest in creating tools and databases for culture and business, and ministries corresponding to its Norwegian counterpart subsidize it
11. Program director, Finnish Swedish language TV.
12. *Dokument 21 fra arbeidsgruppens forslag (Document no. 21 from the proposals of the work group)*, 3 June 2005.
13. Siri Elisabeth Siger: 'Nedleggelse av NIFCA—ett steg frem, kanskje to tilbake?' ('The NIFCA Shutdown—One Step Forward, and Maybe Two Steps Back?') *Kunstskritikk*, 17 December 2004
14. The letter from UKK is displayed on this webpage: http://ukk.dk/brev_nifca.html. UKK points to negative consequences of similar policy in Denmark.
15. 2005 is election year, and several parties have stated a need for a status report on the economical situation of artists and cultural workers. But lately a representative of the SV said that a report might make artists conscious of the need for private insurance, statements of a kind only expected from the right. Reports like this can quickly turn to be used against artists and for a closer collaboration with the business world.
16. IKK (Institute for Artists and Cultural Workers) is an organization based in Malmö working with issues concerning economic and social conditions for artists, curators and other professionals in the art field. Branches of IKK are about to start up in Stockholm and Gothenburg as well.
17. <http://www.statenskonstakademi.com>
18. <http://www.ukk.dk/>

PURE POLICY

EU CULTURAL SUPPORT IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS

Raimund Minichbauer

The progress of EU plans for the future suffered two ruptures in June 2005 with the rejection of the constitution in France and Holland and the subsequent failure of budget negotiations for 2007–2013. The unsatisfactory alternative between a neoliberal constitution and neoliberalism without a constitution, in which formal rights are disregarded while economic liberalisation and measures for 'internal security' find other opportunities for realisation, continues to remain open.

The area of cultural policy which is to be examined here in terms of possible future developments relating to support for contemporary visual arts, is potentially affected by both of these ruptures. As far as the constitution is concerned, apart from the context of society as a whole, the annulment of the unanimous approval from all member states, which was previously required for cultural policy decisions and which has always resulted in a limitation (and delay) of possibilities for further development (a situation further intensified by the increase in the number of member states through expansion in 2004), was anchored in the draft of the constitution.

As far as the budget is concerned, at this time it appears that the fundamental debates on the budget structure and especially the amount of agricultural subventions will probably take place during the planning for the next budget period (beginning 2014). This means, however, that there will be no agreement for some time on the budget for 2007–2013, which is generally not expected before 2006. For cultural support and thus also for support for contemporary visual arts (as in all other areas of support) this means that in addition to the lack of clarity regarding the programme budget, it is to be feared that the new programmes coming into effect beginning in 2007 will be delayed and/or too hastily implemented.

Cultural support and contemporary visual arts

In the area of cultural funding, which is always only complementary to support from the member states and the regions, the EU does not pursue an approach with

programmes relating to special categories. In the first generation of funding programmes, developed in the mid-nineties, there was a certain distribution according to sectors: in addition to the programme Kaleidoscope devoted to performing, visual and applied arts and multimedia projects, there were also the programmes for heritage (*Raphael*) and books/reading (*Ariane*).¹ These three programmes were subsequently grouped together in the framework programme *Culture 2000*, the current funding programme that is still in effect until the end of 2006.

In *Culture 2000* a kind of rotation system was practiced over the course of several years, in which the annual calls were dedicated to a certain sector. For instance, subsidies for 2002 were announced with a focus on visual arts.² This system was justly criticised because of its clumsiness and the fact that cultural producers in a certain field could practically only apply at very large intervals, and it was ended in 2004. Since 2005 applications have been equally possible every year in all (specified) sectors. In addition to 'heritage', 'performing arts' and 'literature, books and reading', there are also provisions for the area of 'visual arts'.³ This specifically means that a special jury of experts has been installed, and that a contingent of projects to be funded is 'reserved' for this sector.

The question of the future of EU funding for contemporary visual arts is thus primarily a question of the programme to follow *Culture 2000*.⁴ This has been in existence under the title *Culture 2007* since Summer 2004 in the form of a proposal from the Commission, and it was just being discussed in the European Parliament in a first reading while the present text was being written (early summer 2005).⁵ The essential features of the programme are thus already known, but two important limitations remain:

On the one hand there is the currently ongoing process of resolution; amendments have been proposed from various sides, some of which have been introduced in parliament. What is not yet definitive in several respects, for instance, is the budget framework (on the one hand specific motions for a

budget increase, on the other the not yet resolved agreement of the Council regarding the overall budget...). In addition to proposals that could lead to structural improvements⁶, there are also more conservative proposals from the rapporteur of the Parliamentary Cultural Committee Vasco Graça Moura for a stronger emphasis on the heritage aspect and funding for translations of Greek and Latin classical works⁷, or an economic proposal originating from the French government to set up a separate funding emphasis for the cultural industry⁸.

The second limitation applies to the structure of the funding programme and the generality of the programme texts, which primarily define a framework. The annual emphases are developed in a committee and characterise the annual calls for applications.⁹ This indeed applies to essential elements. For instance, the aforementioned rotation of sectoral emphases is not mentioned in the programme text of *Culture 2000*, but is first determined in the calls.

Governance and User-Friendliness

Before dealing with the contents of the programmes, a few remarks should be made about the development of the new programme and the style of governance presented in the course of it. Whereas the Commission's work still conveyed an impression of a lack of transparency several years ago, and there was also criticism of the lack of publicly discussed programme evaluations, there were intensified attempts in the discussion of *Culture 2007* to practice/represent a more open style of governance: evaluations of all preceding programmes have been published and presented/commented on by the Commission, seminars have been held, a forum convened, an expert group installed and an Internet survey started.¹⁰

There is also a more extensive discussion of future evaluations in the *Culture 2007* programme text. The tendency here is not only to include evaluation with increasing attention in the programme texts themselves. When one finds terms that are central to EU cultural policies, such as 'European added value', 'cultural added value', and 'socio-economic

impacts*, for instance in the interim evaluation of *Culture 2000*¹¹, which was prepared by a Danish management consultancy firm, and they are not only phrases and catchwords as is usually the case in the official documents¹², but are instead relatively clearly operationalised/defined, this also indicates the potential significance for the concretisation of the contents and the further development of the programmes.

On the way ‘towards a more-user-friendly programme’, an agency is contracted to conduct the programme.¹³ The application procedure is to be simplified and the decision-making process more transparent. With SYMMETRY, software has been developed to take over certain information and monitoring functions for all funding programmes of the Directorate General Education and Culture (DG EAC).¹⁴

Apart from the question of the actual degree of realization, a governance style is evident here as an ideal image, in which potentially everyone can be involved in the discussion —although in subdivided and graduated forms: from participation in the internet survey through inquiries in conjunction with the evaluation to invitations to join the expert group. The other ideal image here is that of a user-friendly programme capable of reproducing itself from the feedback loops set up around it, almost without external content specifications.

Pure Policy

What is conspicuous about the new programme text, in comparison with *Kaleidoscope* and especially with *Culture 2000*, is the reduction of political ambitions and a certain constraint of subject matter.¹⁵ A direct reason for this could be the budget situation. There has been little improvement of this situation in the past, and there are few indications that this is likely to change in the future. The much too limited financial means for the funding program has been strongly criticized from the beginning by cultural producers and their self-organisations. The budget proposed by the Commission for the new programme (408 million € for the entire seven years)

would mean an increase of barely 15% in comparison with the preceding programme.¹⁶ In comparison with this, the ‘70 Cents for Culture’ campaign initiated by the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage (EFAH) and the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) is based on a calculation of actual financial needs from 2004, for which ten times the current budget would be required to cover them.¹⁷

The evaluations of the preceding programmes and the corresponding reports from the Commission point out—already in conjunction with *Kaleidoscope* and even more so with *Culture 2000*—the discrepancy between the ambitious and manifold objectives of the programmes and the inadequate financial resources.¹⁸ The reaction in the program text of *Culture 2007* is obviously to reduce the ambitiousness of the contents.

The consequences are by no means limited to reductions in the sense of reducing the extent of the contents, but are instead recognisable in a clearly more defensive basic attitude. This is already evident in the first paragraph as a striking difference. Whereas it is stated in *Kaleidoscope* that ‘in reality, the most tangible and influential aspect of Europe as a whole is not merely its geographical, political, economic and social features but also its culture’¹⁹, and in *Culture 2000* there is a reference to culture’s ‘important intrinsic value to all people in Europe’²⁰, *Cult* n cultures other than their own. Promoting cultural cooperation and diversity thus helps to make European citizenship a tangible reality by encouraging direct participation by European citizens in the integration process*.

Especially in *Culture 2000* the intrinsic value of culture is emphasised, and on this basis normative statements are made, demands formulated to other policy sectors, the ‘growing importance of culture for European society and the challenges facing the Community at the dawn of the 21st century’²¹ addressed, and it is noted that ‘a better balance should be achieved between the economic and cultural aspects of the Community, so that these aspects can complement and sustain each other’²². Although

references can be found in *Culture 2007* (as in the preceding programmes) to current general EU objectives and to cross-section policies such as gender equality and anti-racism, there are no longer any comparable normative statements derived from an attitude toward the field of culture.²³

Following this further to the objectives of the new programme, it is conspicuous that this approach is narrowed down to the fields assigned to the European level by the subsidiarity principle. Cultural policies belong to the policy fields in the EU that are primarily conceived to be covered by the national and regional level. Hence it is the member states that are primarily responsible, the EU is only responsible for tasks that the member states are not or substantially less efficiently able to deal with.

The specific objectives have been reduced from eight in *Culture 2000* to three in the new programme, which are all anchored in a subsidiarity framework: the 'transnational mobility of people working in the cultural sector', the 'transnational circulation of works and cultural and artistic products'²⁴ and the 'intercultural dialogue'²⁵. In principle the reduction of the objectives and the exclusive reference to the transnational level can also be seen in a positive sense as a clarification. What seems to happen in this context, however, is that all cultural policy aims vanish that do not relate exclusively to the European level. In *Kaleidoscope* and *Culture 2000* there were still general objectives such as increasing access to culture for disadvantaged groups in society, educating artists, and the use of new media, which were not limited per se to the European level. These references have practically vanished in *Culture 2007*.

On the whole, a tendency is evident that aims at a further development of governance and user-friendliness, whereby not only contents are lost, but the mechanisms of management optimisation and the 'abandonment' of content levels also seem to be interlinked to a certain degree. This also potentially opens up the framework for governmentality control mechanisms to function.²⁶

Continuing this train of thought into 2015, the result is

an image of cultural policies that do not operate offensively within EU policies. On the contrary, we see instead a situation in which cultural support is increasingly under pressure for justification with the foreseeable consequences of more emphasis on functionality, on visibility, flagship projects, etc. Under these circumstances, a possible restructuring of the budget (to take effect beginning in 2014), which would shift funding from agriculture in the direction of 'knowledge-based economies', could benefit the cultural industries, but would hardly benefit the non-commercial field of culture. These kinds of developments are not inevitable, however, and largely depend on the extent to which the sector itself conforms or, conversely, how much political pressure it can create for different developments.

Cooperation Focal Points

In addition to the inclusion of the budget line²⁷, previously independent from the programmes, for granting support for the operation of organisations of European cultural interest, the most striking innovation introduced by *Culture 2007* in the fields of action is the enlargement of support for cooperation projects over several years into funding for 'cooperation focal points'²⁸.

The two fields of action to promote one-year and multiple year cooperation projects, together with the 'special actions' since *Kaleidoscope*, formed the core of the cultural programmes (which are not principally oriented to direct support for individual artists).²⁹ Despite contrary demands from the cultural sector, the minimum dimensions/'entry thresholds' have been successively slightly increased: the minimum amount of support has been raised, a minimum extent of financial participation on the part of the most important cooperation partners has been made a condition, etc. The Commission's draft for *Culture 2007* continues this trend, so that, for example, one-year projects in the future will have to involve cooperation partners from four states instead of three as before.

In addition to generally raising the threshold, the

difference between one-year and multiple year projects has been significantly increased. Multiple year projects will not only require six instead of five cooperating organisations, the time period is also increased from three to five years. In the past, the three years only marked the upper limit. It appears that there will be no provisions in the future for less than five years—this is not only how it is formulated, but there are also stipulations to forestall a ‘practical’ shortening of the project duration, and it is indicated that activities must take place in each of the five years.³⁰

The passages concerning the ‘cooperation focal points’ are clearly not formulated in the bottom-up vocabulary of networking, and there are also certain signs of a break: in this context an explicitly degressive support model is introduced for the first time in the cultural programmes—the proportion of funding sinks toward the end of the duration with the perspective that the focal points will be able to fund themselves differently after the five years.³¹

With the focal points, multiple year funding is to be strengthened at the cost of one-year projects (for which it will also become a criterion whether they try out new possibilities of cooperation). Whereas 45% of the budget in *Culture 2000* was still allocated to one-year projects and 35% for multiple year projects, the proportions have been reversed in the *Culture 2007* draft: cooperation focal points 36%, one-year projects 24%.

On the whole it seems that the idea of the ‘cooperation focal points’ works on the structure of a European cultural field—and thus also the area of contemporary visual arts—, in which ‘big players’ are to be increasingly supported and/or created; this is accompanied by a certain tendency to make a localization of these players in the richer member states more probable, which are willing and able to continue financial support for the focal points after the end of the degressive support.

Other policy areas

For several reasons, the program should not be considered

in isolation: the fact that the text of *Culture 2007* appears to be a site of pure policy raises the question, first of all, of the politics inscribed in it and the content-based dynamics arising from these politics. Secondly, the direct influence of other policy areas on cultural policies appears interesting for further developments, and thirdly, there is the question of the internal overall connection or the fragmentation of cultural policies.

Cultural Diversity in an Area of Freedom and Security

If we look for a driving point of reference in the contents of *Culture 2007*, this is found primarily in the further development of EU citizenship and, in this context, the immediate reference to the citizens. These references appear heterogeneous and often even contradictory, especially in the ‘Explanatory Memorandum’³² supplementing the Commission’s proposal:

On the one hand, it seems that the entirety of potential recipients are addressed with ‘citizens’, whereby the infrastructure of the cultural field is sometimes seriously and instrumentally foreshortened and concepts of ‘customer orientation’³³ do not appear to be far away: ‘As the Commission indicated in a recent communication, “European citizens are of course the ultimate target group of all EU actions in the field of culture. However, the European institutions need intermediaries in order to reach those citizens and to offer high quality cultural actions with a European dimension”. These intermediaries are theatres, museums, professional associations, research centres, universities, cultural institutes, the authorities, etc.’³⁴

In another passage the artists and cultural producers themselves appear in their characteristic as citizens, where it is noted that ‘cultural operators, and therefore citizens, should be given more opportunities to create networks, carry out projects, be more mobile or promote cultural dialogue in Europe and in other regions of the globe’.³⁵

And finally the old problem that cultural policies are also always regarded as a possibility for PR for the EU and its institutions is extended in this context beyond the wish

for representative projects or awards to the cultural policies themselves.³⁶ When it is discussed in the 'Explanatory Memorandum' that there are still two programme lines that are not integrated even after merging the three programmes in *Culture 2000*, there is a criticism of the lack of coherency in this situation, but the image problem is even more prominent: 'This dispersal into three actions harms the Community's image with its citizens, who are unaware of the efforts to preserve and expand the influence of their cultures and the taking into account of the cultural dimension in the construction of Europe'.³⁷

The theme of citizenship refers directly to a communique from the Commission, which addresses various funding areas of the DG EAC.³⁸ In terms of political contents, however, it seems more interesting to go a step further to the 'Financial Perspectives' for 2007–2013, in which the Commission outlines the political project for this period.³⁹

Locating cultural policies in the 'political ontology' of this explanation would seem to be worth a separate investigation. The cultural area is assigned to priority b 'giving full content to European citizenship', which is subdivided into three points: 1/ the area of freedom, security, and justice; 2/ access to basic goods and services, and 3/ making citizenship work: fostering European culture and diversity.

The proximity of cultural policies to the border regime and internal security will need to be observed, and the question will have to be raised in the coming years again and again, to what extent the capability attributed to the cultural area, of being able to transform what is viewed as a constantly growing diversity into elements of an identity of a higher order⁴⁰, also functions as part of the production of the ambivalent 'super basic right'⁴¹ of security. At the level of pragmatic arguments, on the other hand, theses for cultural policies based on culture commons counter to economisation and cultural industrialisation could be derived from the proximity to 'access to basic goods and services'.⁴²

Foreign Policy, Trade Policy

One area that will certainly grow in significance also in terms of the field of arts and culture in the next years is that of foreign policy. For the new regional situation following the major round of expansion in spring 2004 the EU developed a new neighborhood policy, in which a certain importance is attributed to cultural cooperation among the so-called 'people-to-people' issues.⁴³ This is not limited only to the neighborhood policy, but also applies to foreign policy in the global context.

The topic is highly present, yet at the same time a truly tangible implementation does not seem to be imminent. A greater significance of this area is hardly to be read in the Commission's draft of *Culture 2007*, for instance. Although there have been announcements for cooperation projects — with Japan and India — in recent years, on the whole these appear to be individual measures with too small a scope, and it is evident that there is little system or longer-term perspectives behind them.⁴⁴

Explicit demands are audible, however. The amendments to EFAH that are called for, for instance, also include a more precise supplementary specification of the focal point 'intercultural dialogue' with the dimension of 'intercontinental' and mention of the external policy in Article 7.⁴⁵ With the large-scale cultural policy conference *Sharing Cultures* in July 2004 the European Cultural Foundation devoted a separate panel to this theme⁴⁶, which was based on a bilingual paper published in *Kulturpolitische Mitteilungen*⁴⁷, and also pointed out the need for a comprehensive study of cultural aspects of a future EU foreign policy⁴⁸ in conjunction with preparations for the Foundation's LAB (Laboratory of European Cultural Cooperation)⁴⁹, scheduled to start in Spring 2006.

Trade policy should at least be mentioned here with the wide-ranging problematic field of GATS⁵⁰ and its counterpart at the level of the domestic market, the Services Directive (so-called Bolkestein Directive)⁵¹. Predictions are all the more difficult in this respect, since there is a twofold lack of clarity: the open political question of the extent to which economic liberalisation can be prevented and, dependent on this, the

question of the impact on the area of culture due to the liberalisation that cannot be prevented.

Fragmentation

In Article 151 (Article III-280 of the draft constitution), which forms the legal basis for cultural policies in the EU in the treaties, it is stated in Paragraph 4 that 'the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures'.⁵² On the one hand, this forms the basis at least for counter-arguments in conjunction with the aforementioned problem fields of GATS and Services Directive, and it is in any case the foundation for taking culture into consideration in other support programmes as well.

The number of (theoretical) possibilities is substantial. For instance, the (German-language) portal *Europa fördert Kultur*, developed by the German Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft and the österreichische kulturdokumentation, covers about ninety 'EU funding possibilities for projects with a cultural focal point'.⁵³

The most important possibilities are found here, on the one hand, in the other funding areas of the DG EAC (audio-visual, media, youth, citizenship, education⁵⁴) and on the other in the structural funds, in other words the EU funds for regional and structural policies⁵⁵. Although this has the advantage that more funding can be acquired for visual arts and other areas of art, if there are no countermeasures through intensive linking, it also leads to an increasing fragmentation of cultural policies.

Thus the structural funds not only imply certain economicisation approaches in cultural funding (which are interested in the economic potential and job creation potential of the creative industries, the use of cultural heritage for tourism, the development of 'soft location factors'...), they also follow certain concepts of space (developing the 'endogenous potential' of regional and local entities⁵⁶), political foundations ('competitiveness and cohesion reinforce

each other'⁵⁷) and governance models⁵⁸, which threaten to become the dominant model of cultural policy as well, at least in some rural regions.

If we look at relevant indications in the Commission's draft of *Culture 2007*, the further improvement of the preparation of information and thus a tendency toward a further improvement of artists' and cultural producers' access to these funding possibilities appears to be a clear objective. On the other hand, however, the references to Article 151, Paragraph 4 and the objective of coordination with other funding programmes, as they are included in the Commission's proposal, seem to be a reduction in comparison with *Culture 2000*. In other words, a further increase in the fragmentation of cultural policies may be expected from this basis.

Networking and transversal collaboration

The area of non-governmental culture political actors at the European level has been marked primarily by the European cultural networks, whose development indicates certain parallels (interplays) with that of EU cultural policies. In the 1980s and even more in the 90s, a large number of transnational organisations/cooperations with more or less formalised membership has arisen here in the most diverse areas—art education, residential art centres, cultural administration training, contemporary art centres, visual artists, organisations, contemporary theatre...⁵⁹

These networks have resulted in an infrastructure for transnational cooperation, its reflection and cultural-political self-organisation, whereby networking as a manner of cooperation has also modernised and changed older international structures—such as existing international associations influenced by the counter-model of a-hierarchical flat structures of cooperation or the bilateral logic of cooperation among nation states and their cultural institutes abroad, which started to develop as a reaction to the working mode of networks in the direction of a more multilateral model of cooperation.⁶⁰

Beginning in the late nineties the dynamics of new initiatives began to slow down, and a 'consolidation' of the field set in, in which a kind of core of strong and lasting networks crystallised. At the same time, it seemed that the beginnings of a 'change of paradigms' became recognisable, which would lead to a stronger focus on the nodes and centres than on the lines of networks (the formulations relating to the 'cooperation focal points' in *Culture 2007* may also be a consequence of this partial 'change of paradigms').

Even though the dynamic has slowed down, and in some cases there may be tendencies to appropriate networks (to present a kind of 'democratic' legitimisation from the basis) or some changes may lead to an increased top-down manner of functioning, in the coming years the networks will form an important infrastructure for cooperation, reflection and cultural political self-organisation. The fact that the budget line for support for the operation of organisations of European cultural interest, from which several networks receive basic funding, has been included in *Culture 2007* and is thus much more visible as a funding possibility, will also lead to discussions about the extent to which the EU is prepared to ensure long-term basic funding for transnational infrastructures.

For the question of the further development of methods of self-organisation and collaboration in transnational contexts, however, the cooperations among cultural networks that are usually limited to specific sectors will only be a special case. This must be seen in a much broader context. Innovative approaches are found here mostly in the context of visual arts, in the self-reflexive practices following from the traditions of institutional critique⁶¹; transversal cooperations conjoining the art field with political movements⁶², and new forms of cooperation that already reflexively include the insights of the governmentality concept.

For several years now, these practices have been exposed to a fundamental self-criticism, which questions the avant-garde role of the art field in the process of the increasing precarisation of working and living conditions or

the—in retrospect—far too easy way that artistic criticism can be coopted by capitalism to renew itself.⁶³ Important concepts such as participation, networking, performance, empowerment find themselves exposed to 'generalisation effects' and re-codings that seem to seal their compatibility with the developments of neoliberalisation.⁶⁴

Following Gerald Raunig's thesis that after a more 'liberal' phase, now a more 'authoritarian' phase of neoliberalism will set in, it is to be assumed that the field of arts and culture will increasingly be confronted with direct repressions beyond the incorporation effects of governmentality control.⁶⁵ At the same time, it will be important that this field does not neglect self-criticism from the still 'liberal' phase. It seems that in the years to come, a further development of critical practices and methods of self-organisation and collaboration will be possible primarily in confrontation with this self-criticism.

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1. Cf. the brief description of the programmes on the EU Culture web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/culture2000/historique/historic_en.html).
2. Cf. results of the call (<http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/1255&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>).
3. One-year projects can additionally be proposed for the areas of 'translation' and cultural cooperation projects in third countries'; multi-year projects are only possible in the sectors named above. Cf. the announcement for 2006 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/how_particip2000/pract_info/appel_2006_en.html).
4. A brief (self-)presentation of EU cultural policies relating to visual arts can be found at the European Cultural Portal (http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/portal/activities/visual/v_training_en.htm).
5. 'Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing

the *Culture 2007* programme (2007–2013), (presented by the Commission)', COM(2004) 469 final (14.7.2004), referred to in the following as *Culture 2007*

6. For instance, the 'Revised proposals for amendments by the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage (EFAH)' (not published).
7. Cf. the draft report, which also includes interesting structural proposals: 'DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the *Culture 2007* programme (2007–2013)', (COM(2004)0469 - C6-0094/2004 - 2004/0150(COD)), Committee on Culture and Education, Rapporteur: Vasco Graça Moura (http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/PR/571/571841/571841en.pdf).
8. Entitled as 'non audio-visual cultural industries' (music and publishing industry, architecture...), which was probably also chosen because with MEDIA PLUS there is already a separate EU support program for the audio-visual sector (on the successor program MEDIA 2007 see also the proposal from the Commission [COM(2004) 470 final] (http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/media/pdffiles/com470_en.pdf)).

9. Under supervision by the Commission, with representatives from the member states (*Culture 2007*, op.cit., article 9. p. 16).
10. Cf. 'Explanatory Memorandum', 2.1. (*Culture 2007*, op.cit., p. 2/3) and the references to materials indicated there.
11. Cf. the Final Report of the 'Interim Evaluation of the *Culture 2000 Programme*' (http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/sources_info/pdf-word/final_report-Culture2000.pdf).
12. On one of the few attempts of political definition, cf. the 'ENTSCHLIESSUNG DES RATES vom 19. Dezember 2002 zur Umsetzung des Arbeitsplans für die Europäische Zusammenarbeit im Kulturbereich: Zusätzlicher europäischer Nutzen und Mobilität von Personen und Umlauf von Werken im Kulturbereich' (Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 2003/C 13/03 [the English version was not available at the time of the publication of the present text]).
13. *Culture 2007*, op.cit., p. 8.
14. 'System for the Management and Monitoring of Education, Training, Youth, Culture and other DG Education and Culture Programmes. SYMMETRY is a Management Information System and Programme Management System to be used by the DG Education and Culture, National Agencies, Technical Assistance Offices, as well as by the Executive Agency in the near future. The System will provide all the necessary functionality to actors involved in all aspects of Programme management activities and not only just project management, which means that it will allow establishment of work plans, to manage budgets and to give the possibility of creating reports in line with the different user profiles (DG Education and Culture, National Agencies, Executive Agency). In particular, the new system will allow to follow up Programmes at centralised and de-centralised level, it will allow the online-submission of applications, it will also serve as communication basis between cultural operators among Europe with a common interest for actions with a European Added Value' ('Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the *Culture 2000 Programme* in the years 2000 and 2001', p. 21).
15. In this context, see also two eipcc papers, which outline/propose possible future developments based on *Culture 2000*, the current status at the time of writing: Therese Kaufmann, Gerald Raunig, with a commentary by Stefan Nowotny: 'Anticipating European Cultural Policies', Vienna 2003 (<http://www.eipcc.net/policies/index.html>), eipcc: 'Post Culture 2000', Vienna 2003 (http://www.eipcc.net/policies/text/postculture2000_en.htm).
16. 'The European Commission proposes 408 million € over 7 years as the financial framework and claims this represents a 39% increase (compared to the 167 million € for the *Culture 2000 programme*, which had an original duration of 5 years, and then additional, but separate cultural actions) according to a Commission memo of 15th July. How the Commission arrived at the 39% figure is not explained. However, it can be demonstrated that the real increase amounts to only about 14%' (European Forum for the Arts and Heritage, 'Briefing Paper on Commission Proposal for the *Culture 2007 programme*', http://www.efah.org/en/pdf_general/Culture_2007_EFAH.doc).
17. (<http://www.efah.org/en/70cents.htm>).
18. Cf. for instance: 'However, both the evaluation and the consultation revealed some shortcomings in the programme, for example the fact that the programme has too many different objectives, especially given the limited budget allocated to it'. ('Making citizenship Work: fostering European culture and diversity through programmes for Youth, Culture, Audiovisual and Civic Participation' (Communication by the Commission, COM(2004) 154 final [9.3.2004]), p. 10).
19. 'DECISION No 719/96/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 29 March 1996 establishing a programme to support artistic and cultural activities having a European dimension

- (Kaleidoscope)' (Official Journal L 099, 20/04/1996, p. 20-26).
20. 'DECISION No 508/2000/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 February 2000 establishing the *Culture 2000 programme*' (Official Journal L 63, 10/03/2000, p. 1-9).
21. *Culture 2000*, op.cit., (4).
22. Ibid., (5); in this context see also Stefan Nowotny's critical analysis of the *Culture 2000 programme* text: 'Ethnos or Demos? Ideological implications within the discourse on "European culture"' (<http://www.eipcc.net/diskurs/d01/text/sn02.html>).
23. Cf. *Culture 2007*, op.cit., p. 10/11, (4), (5).
24. This objective is obviously also understood under economic aspects, when it is noted in the 'Explanatory Memorandum' that it 'responds to certain basic Community tasks' such as the 'completion of the internal market' (*Culture 2007*, op.cit., p. 6).
25. On the emphases, cf.: *Culture 2007*, op.cit., article 3; for the mobility of artists and cultural operators and for the circulation of works, the Council's work plan for culture—2005/2006 also provides for further measures (the work plan is published in the press release for the council meeting on education, youth and culture in Brussels, 15–16 Nov 2004; cf. pt. 4 and 5 on p. 33 [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/educ/82695.pdf]).
26. On this, cf. Gerald Raunig, 2015, in this book, p. 14.
27. Cf. *Culture 2007*, p. 22 and the 'DECISION No 792/2004/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 21 April 2004 establishing a Community action programme to promote bodies active at European level in the field of culture' (Official Journal L 138, 30/03/2004, p. 40-43) and the 'Final Report for the evaluation of the line A-3042: Organisations promoting European culture' (http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/sources_info/pdf-word/final_report_feb_2003.pdf).
28. Cf. *Culture 2007*, op.cit., p. 20.
29. EU cultural support is not granted directly to individuals, but rather to organisations. Thus the focal point of promoting the mobility of artists and cultural producers does not mean that support is given directly to individuals, but rather to cooperation projects among organisations, in which this aspect is implemented.
30. 'These activities are to be implemented throughout the duration of Community financing.' (*Culture 2007*, op.cit., p.20), the German version is even stricter: 'These activities must cover the entire period of Community financing.'
31. However, this is only partially implemented in the multilingual context of EU documents. The German version of the Commission's draft of *Culture 2007* is nevertheless entitled 'Kooperations-netze' ['Cooperation Networks']. In a communication from the Commission from March 2004 ('Aktive Bürgerschaft konkret verwirklichen: Förderung der europäischen Kultur und Vielfalt durch Programme im Bereich Jugend, Bürgerbeteiligung, Kultur und audiovisuelle Medien' [KOM(2004) 154 final]) the field of action is more aptly translated with 'Centres for Cultural Cooperation' (p. 13).
32. Explanations of arguments for the drafted legislation, which will not be part of the legislation itself; *Culture 2007*, p. 2-9.
33. Cf.: Ulf Wuggenig: 'Burying the Death of the Author' (http://republicart.net/disc/aap/wuggenig03_en.htm).
34. *Culture 2007*, p. 4
35. Ibid.
36. Cf. in this context the arguments against promoting 'flagship projects' in: eipcc, 'Post Culture 2000', op.cit.
37. Ibid., p. 3.
38. 'Making citizenship Work', op.cit.
39. 'Building our Common Future. Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007–2013', COM(2004) 101 final (10.2.2004).
40. Here there is a notable statement that 'immigration has already increased the Union's cultural diversity' ('Building our common future', op.cit., p. 21), which does not lead to going beyond concepts of

cultural identity, but certainly beyond the horizon of the cultural support programmes, in which 'cultural diversity' in the European context always assumes simply the meaning of a diversity of (necessarily essentially defined) national and regional cultures. This seems even more remarkable, since the explanation otherwise principally seems to adhere to this horizon: 'Our shared objective should be a Europe that celebrates the cultural and national diversity of each Member State, remains attached to national identity, yet is also committed to the value of European identity and the political will to achieve common goals.' (Ibid., p. 3) On the fundamental connection, cf.: 'It is precisely this fundamental ambiguity of the discourse on 'European culture' that we should start from, when it is about a democratisation of European cultural policies: by promoting open discussions in the cultural field on the significance of the political project of the European Union (as well as discussions on a possible re-definition of cultural policies and activities in a supranational framework), instead of reducing this political project to a common cultural heritage; by taking into account the processes of the social re-composition of European societies, specifically in a post-colonial situation and in view of recent and present migrations, instead of sticking to the idea of a European cultural identity as a kind of "sum total" of different national or regional identities; and finally, by strengthening the actual means that are necessary for the emergence of a European demos—like non-commercial public spheres, facilities for participation beyond national or disciplinary boundaries, language competencies, multilingual projects, etc.—instead of appealing to a fictitious European ethnicity.' (Stefan Nowotny, Answering the question: Are cultural policies part of democratic policies? [http://www.ejpcp.net/policies/text/nowotny06_en.html]).

41. Rolf Gössner, quoted from: Tom Holert, "Sicherheit", in: Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne

Krasmann, Thomas Lemke (Ed.), *Glossar der Gegenwart*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2004.

42. Cf. the chapter 'Remapping Access. Culture Commons instead of Cultural Industries', in: Kaufmann/Raunig, 'Anticipating European Cultural Policies', op.cit., p. 34–35.

43. Cf. 'European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper' (COM(2004) 373 final [12.5.2004]), e.g. p. 20–21.

44. The entire budget for applications for cooperation projects with Japan amounted to 600,000. € (cf. 'Call for Proposals —DG EAC 67/04 specifications' [http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/how_particip2000/mod_action3/pdf_word/call_eu_japon.pdf, on the results: http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/culture2000/special_events/japon_en.html]).

45. 'Revised proposal', op.cit.

46. Cf. 'A Report on the ECF Conference 'Sharing Cultures: A contribution to cultural policies for Europe'', Report by Therese Kaufmann, edited by David Cameron (http://www.eurocult.org/pdfdb/intro/ReportSC.pdf).

47. 'Does Europe Need a Foreign Cultural Policy? A preliminary work by Kathinka Dittrich van Weringh and Ernst Schürmann' (http://www.eurocult.org/pdfdb/sharing/kathinkadcultforeign.doc).

48. Robert Palmer, 'On the Road to Cultural Components of a Future Foreign EU Policy: the need for a comprehensive study', (http://www.eurocult.org/pdfdb/sharing/RPalmer.pdf).

49. (http://www.eurocult.org/lab/).

50. Cf., for instance, the *GATS FREE ZONES* project by the Commons Service Group, which was realised at the Venice Biennale 2005 and elsewhere (http://www.ecole-dumagasin.com/csg/); Gary Neil (Coord.), 'General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). A Growing Threat to Cultural Policy' (http://www.incd.net/paper03.html).

51. (http://www.stopbolkestein.org/).

52. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/sources_info/official_doc/article151_en.html).

53. (http://www.europa-foerdert-kultur.info/).

54. The European *Culture Portal* provides an

overview (http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/portal/funding/eac_en.htm).

55. On this, cf. 'Structural actions in support of tourism and culture' on the Inforegio web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/themes/cultur_en.htm).

56. Cf. Raimund Minichbauer, 'Regional Strategies. On Spatial Aspects of European Cultural Policies', Vienna 2005 (http://www.ejpcp.net/policies/text/registrat_en.htm).

57. 'Building our common future', op.cit., p. 4.

58. Cf. Raimund Minichbauer, 'Regional Strategies', op.cit., Chapter 'Cultural Policy and Regional Governance' (p. 17–19).

59. See examples (http://www.elia.ahk.nl/, (http://www.resartis.org/), (http://www.encatc.org/), (http://www.c3.hu/ican/), (http://www.e-v-a-n.org/), (http://www.iem.org)).

60. Cf. Martin Roeder-Zerndt: 'The Politics of Networking', in: *impulse* [ITI newsletter], congress special, Marseille, May 2000.

61. See also the three-year visual arts project 'TRANSFORM' starting in Autumn 2005 (http://transform.ejpcp.net).

62. 'Whereas interdisciplinarity has become a mainstream issue and commonplace in all forms of contemporary art and theory production, transversality tends to transcend the borders of the arts field, the academic field, or the political field. The concept of transversality does not imply a notion of certain points or disciplines as being connected, but a line of flight that constitutes new directions beyond the existing points and produces constant change. The notion of transversality is thus more than a descriptive tool in the arts world, it becomes a concept concerned with political struggles.' (Kaufmann/Raunig, Anticipating European Cultural Policies, op.cit.), on the concept of transversality, see also: Gerald Raunig, 'Transversal Multitudes' (http://republicart.net/disc/mundial/raunig02_en.htm).

63. Cf. Luc Boltanski, Eve Chiapello, *Le nouvel Éprit du Capitalisme* (1999); the English translation *The New Spirit of Capitalism* is due to be published in March 2006 by Verso.

64. Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann,

Thomas Lemke, 'Einleitung', in: *ibid.*, *Glossar der Gegenwart*, op.cit., p. 9–16, here p. 11.

65. Gerald Raunig, 2015, in this book, p. 14.

publications in the fields of contemporary philosophy, art theory, political aesthetics and cultural politics. Recent books: *Kunst und Revolution. Künstlerischer Aktivismus im langen 20. Jahrhundert*, Wien: Turia+Kant 2005; *PUBLICUM. Theorien der Öffentlichkeit*, Wien: Turia+Kant 2005 (ed. by Gerald Raunig and Ulf Wuggenig).

Cornelia Sollfrank is an artist, author and networker. Since the mid-nineties she has been researching the worldwide networks of communication, testing new forms of authorship in them, continuing artistic methods of appropriation and working on the deconstruction of myths revolving around genius and originality. Her work focuses on copyright and investigating various forms of collaboration, networking and communication as art forms. Much of her work includes—implicitly or explicitly—a gender-specific approach. She regards her active involvement in cultural politics as part of her artistic practice. <http://artwarez.org>

åbåke is a partnership of four graphic designers. Patrick Lacey, Benjamin Reichen, Kajsa Ståhl and Maki Suzuki formed the association in July 2000 after graduating from the Royal College of Art where they currently teach. The obvious realisation that interesting content is a prerequisite to interesting design lead them to co-edit *Sexymachinery*, a self-published magazine; run their own music label with two french people (*Kitsuné*); the organisation of projects involving cooking (with furniture designer Martino Gamper), dancing, music, amateur sport and reading. They enjoy regular collaborations with Apolonija Šušteršič, Johanna Billing, Ella Gibbs & Amy Plant. They can be contacted by dialing +44 (0)20 7249 2380.

January 2015

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